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ABSTRACT 
 
 
THE PERSISTENCE OF SPATIAL MISMATCH: THE DETERMINANTS OF 
MOVING DECISION AMONG LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS 
 
By 
 
BULENT ANIL 
 
DECEMBER 2007 
 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. David L. Sjoquist 
Major Department: Economics 
 
This dissertation aims to investigate alternative explanations for the adjustment of low-
income inner-city minorities to residential locations. Particularly, this study searches for 
an answer to find the reason why low-income inner-city minorities do not move to 
residential locations with more job opportunities (suburbs).  Much of the basis for the 
analysis in this dissertation derives from the irreversible investment theory under the 
assumption that moving can be considered as an irreversible investment. First, this study 
formulates a search model in which individuals simultaneously search jobs and 
residential locations in two places: Suburb and inner-city. Second, by employing The 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and Geocode files, this study attempts to 
address how social capital plays a role in households’ moving decisions under the 
irreversibility assumption. This study presents evidence that the social capital has a 
negative causal effect on moving decision, that is, the high levels of social capital reduce 
the probability of moving. 
  
1
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Background 
Over the second half of the twentieth century, the United States has undergone a 
steady decentralization of low-skill jobs.  However, the residential location patterns of 
low-skilled workers have not decentralized accordingly.  The low degree of 
suburbanization among low-skilled workers combined with the decentralization of low-
skill jobs has resulted in a spatial mismatch between job opportunities and the residential 
location of low-skilled workers.  Kain (1968) pioneered the idea that low-skilled 
minorities in inner cities face higher unemployment rates and lower wages due to the 
decentralization of their jobs combined with housing segregation, which is referred to as 
the “spatial mismatch hypothesis” (SMH).  The SMH mainly asserts that the spatial 
disparity between the location of low-skill jobs and the residence of low-skilled workers 
results in negative labor market outcomes for low-skilled residents who reside closer to 
the central business district (CBD).   Although the formulation of this hypothesis, which 
has attracted strong interest from researchers in the last decade, is the direct result of 
problems that U.S. cities face, it has attracted widespread interest and triggered extensive 
research well beyond the confines of the United States. 
Gobillon et al. (2003) summarized the factors that explain spatial mismatch.  
First, while low-skill jobs have decentralized significantly faster than low-skilled 
workers, a similar correspondence between high-skill jobs and high-skilled workers is not 
evident. Second, although the unemployment rate is significantly higher in inner cities, 
the number of new job openings is relatively higher in the suburbs. Finally, while whites, 
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on average, have a higher rate of suburbanization, blacks experience higher average 
commuting distance and higher dependency on public transportation. 
Following Kain’s findings, some studies argue that the negative outcomes for 
minorities in the labor market are not the consequences of the spatial distribution of jobs 
and people. Elwood (1986), for example, claimed that low-income households in the 
suburbs face similar problems, so race, not space, plays a more salient role in explaining 
the negative labor market outcomes of minorities. Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist (1990), on the 
other hand, showed that proximity to a job is crucial to employment, and thus, the lower 
employment rate of black youth relative to white youth may be one of the consequences 
of massive job decentralization. Wilson (1987, 1996) claims that this phenomenon is a 
result of increasing “lack of contact” and “isolation” among black youth. 
Although it has been widely discussed, the mechanism behind the mismatch is 
still vague. The foremost assumption found in the existing literature is that low-income 
individuals are willing to move to places with ample job opportunities, but they are not 
able to move because of external constraints.  Only a few studies call attention to the 
possible reluctance of inner-city residents to relocate. Ihlanfeldt and Scafidi (2002) find 
evidence of a preference among blacks to live among blacks. Another way to identify 
minorities’ willingness or reluctance to relocate their residences is to look at the 
neighborhoods where they search for jobs. Sjoquist (2001) stresses that an individual’s 
perception of social acceptability significantly affects his job search location. In addition, 
a growing body of literature emphasizes the effect of the neighborhood as an informal 
network in the job search process, arguing that the link established between a household 
and a neighborhood, referred to as “social capital,” can be an operative tool in a job 
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search. Social capital may even play a vital role in the absence of human capital so that a 
low-skilled household may prefer to maintain its association with a particular 
neighborhood until that time when the opportunity cost of breaking that association is at a 
minimum.  Individuals may also simply be attempting to avoid any drawbacks of a 
potentially insecure job in the suburbs while compromising their connections to the 
neighborhood social capital, both of which may delay their relocation decision.  In fact, 
for these individuals, social capital may actually be the link to relatively secure 
employment opportunities.1   
 
Statement of the Problem 
This dissertation investigates alternative explanations for the adjustment of low-
income inner-city minorities to residential locations.  In particular, this study attempts to 
find the reason why low-income inner-city minorities do not move to residential locations 
with more job opportunities (suburbs) even if they secure a job in these places.  Much of 
the basis for the analysis in this study derives from the irreversible investment theory.  
The notion of irreversibility refers to a major investment that can not be recovered.  
Irreversible investment theory has previously been studied in environmental economics, 
real estate economics, and capital investment literature (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994; Mahul & 
Gohin, 1999; Pindyck, 1991; Titman, 1985). This research argues the benefit of delaying 
an investment until the future becomes less uncertain, and thus leaving open the option to 
choose a better investment. Additional information about the future reduces uncertainty 
and facilitates decision making.  Applying this notion to a residential mobility 
                                                 
1 See Mouw (2003), Aguilera (2002), Granovette (1973) for detailed information on 
social capital and its relationship to the job market. 
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framework, this study explains the rationale behind the decisions of inner-city minorities 
to remain in their respective neighborhoods by households’ desire to keep the option of 
moving open until the future becomes less uncertain.  
If the above mentioned assumption holds, one would expect to find that inner city 
minorities experience a relatively higher commuting time and commuting distance not 
only because of the potential barriers they face but also because of their reluctance to 
move from their inner city neighborhoods. Therefore, the studies that use commuting 
distance and commuting time to investigate the spatial mismatch problem account for the 
effects of both barrier and reluctance.  Nevertheless, most of the studies fail to 
acknowledge the inclusion of the effect of reluctance on the time and the distance of the 
commute for inner city minorities.2     
It is reasonable to assume is the existence of a strong correlation between the 
reluctance of inner city minorities to relocate and their connection to their neighborhoods.  
In other words, the reluctance to move is directly related to an individual’s social capital.  
In the literature, social capital is broadly defined as the interaction with community. If 
physical proximity to the neighborhood is a way to maintain social capital, and if social 
capital is a link to the labor market, then the optimum decision for households might be 
to stay in their neighborhoods rather than move closer to job opportunities.  An 
underlining assumption that follows this statement is that inner city residents will lose 
their connections if they move away from the central city.  The few studies that have 
tested this argument have found that the social capital of an individual decreases 
                                                 
2 Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist (1998) asserted that the use of commuting time and distance in analysis 
is a weak test of the spatial mismatch hypothesis. Similarly, DeRango (2001) called the 
relationship between the spatial mismatch problem and commuting distance “indeterminate” 
since it depends on the rate at which employment probabilities diminish with distance. However, 
neither of the studies accounts for the effects of reluctance. 
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following a move (Glaeser, Laibson, & Sacerdote, 2002; Pettit & McLanahan, 2003; 
Pribesh & Downey, 1999).  
Another issue that should be addressed is whether or not a household can regain 
social capital by moving back to the initial neighborhood. In other words, is the loss of 
social capital irreversible?  To date, none of the studies have focused on the irreversibility 
of social capital primarily owing to the variation in the measurement of social capital.  
That is, does the irreversibility of social capital depend on to how important a household 
finds social capital? 
The literature has assigned myriad definitions for social capital, which can be 
classified into three categories: The first includes variables that rely on measures without 
a temporal dimension. For example, homeownership, assumed to reduce the probability 
of moving, increases the longevity in a neighborhood, and thus, has a higher social 
capital value.   Testing this hypothesis, DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) and Glaeser  et al. 
(2002) supported its validity, finding a positive relationship between homeownership and 
social capital.  Another example is racial similarity in the neighborhood. Ihlanfeldt and 
Scafidi’s (2002) argument that blacks prefer living with other blacks can be interpreted as 
their way of attaining higher social capital.  A similar, more recent study by Charles and 
Kline(2006) also use racial similarity as a measure for social capital.3 
The second category uses variables that include a time dimension.  One might 
assume that the longer one lives in the neighborhood, the more social capital an 
individual accumulates.  DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) also argued that the duration in a 
neighborhood is a strong predictor for the extent of the social capital. 
                                                 
3 Studies by James (2000) and Sagas and Cunningham (2005) represent examples from different 
fields that use racial similarity as a measure of social capital. 
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The third category includes variables that deal with an individual’s connectedness 
to a neighborhood. Most studies measure social capital according to an individual’s 
interaction with a neighborhood.  Several examples of variables used to measure 
interaction were the level at which one participates in community activities, the number 
of individuals that one knows in the neighborhood, and the extent to which an individual 
trusts his neighbors (Pettit & McLanahan, 2003; Pribesh & Downey, 1999).4 
This dissertation uses one measure from each category.   The first relies on racial 
similarity in the neighborhood.  The second measure involves the length of residence in a 
neighborhood before a move.  The third measures the household head’s connectedness to 
the neighborhood.    The assumptions of this analysis are that households lose their social 
connections if they move away from their neighborhoods and that they do not gain back 
the social capital even if they move back to the initial neighborhood, so the loss of social 
capital is irreversible.   
This dissertation uses the Panel Study Income Dynamics (PSID) data set from the 
Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan.  The PSID dataset consist of 
longitudinal data in which 5,000 families and their children were interviewed each year 
beginning in 1968.    Permission from the Institute for Social Research (ISR) at the 
University of Michigan was obtained to use a confidential supplemental data set, the 
PSID Geocode Match Files.  With Geocode Match Files, it is possible to match the 
household information with the U.S. Census by using the census tracts that households 
live in. This data set is unique with its detailed portrait of the neighborhood environment 
of the PSID respondents.  This study will estimate the effect of social capital on the 
moving probability of households. By employing longitudinal data, it will attempt to 
                                                 
4 For a detailed review of social capital studies, see Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) 
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address how social capital plays a role in the decision to move under the assumption that 
if it is lost, the loss is irreversible. 
    
Contributions of the Dissertation 
This study contributes to existing literature in multiple ways. First, although 
studies agree on the negative effects of spatial mismatch on inner-city residents’ labor 
market outcomes, the mechanism behind the spatial mismatch is still imprecise. This 
study suggests an alternative approach to identifying the underlying mechanisms of 
spatial mismatch.   Whereas neighborhood attachment as a reason why individuals 
voluntarily remain in a neighborhood has been covered in the literature, the role of social 
capital has not.   
Another way this dissertation contributes to existing literature is that it considers 
the relocation by inner city minorities an investment and examines whether or not a move 
represents an irreversible investment. To date, none of the existing studies have explained 
the behavior of intra-urban residential mobility using the notion of irreversibility. Within 
the context of the notion of irreversibility, households would consider not only observed, 
tangible costs (e.g., moving costs and commuting costs) but also the intangible value of 
the option not to move.  Accordingly, each household may place differing values on 
moving to the suburbs. If this explanation is valid, minorities who live in the suburbs may 
be those with low social capital. 
Third, none of the previous studies associate the distance of a move with the 
social capital of a household.  If social capital is a factor in residential mobility, then one 
would expect that the probability that a household with strong attachment to the 
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neighborhood would move should decrease as moving distance increases.  The 
confidential Geocode information will facilitate the investigation of the relationship 
between moving distance and social capital. 
Finally, this study extends the irreversible international migration framework of 
Damm and Rosholm (2003; C. Dawkins, 2006)  and sets an intra-urban residential 
mobility framework by adding a commuting component. 
 
Overview of the Chapters  
This dissertation is organized as follows.  Chapter 2, which presents a detailed 
literature review on intra-urban residential mobility and the spatial mismatch hypothesis, 
has four main components:   First, it reviews the literature that focuses on the barriers 
(e.g., residential segregation, labor market segregation, and poor access to transportation 
mediums) as the reason for the lack of mobility of inner city minorities; then it reviews 
the literature,  including that on irreversible investment, which associates risk with 
residential mobility; third, this chapter reviews studies on the job search process of low-
income individuals; and finally, it  reviews studies that focus on social capital and its 
effect on residential mobility.  Chapter 3 formulates a search model in which individuals 
simultaneously search for jobs and residential locations in two places, in the suburbs and 
the inner city. Using Van Ommeren et al. (1997, 2000) and Damm and Rosholm (2003) 
as base models, a model will be developed that classifies individuals in three categories:  
stayers, movers, and commuters.  Chapter 4 continues by discussing the data from the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics and the methodology of this study, chapter 5 presents 
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the empirical findings from the study, and finally, chapter 6 provides a brief summary of 
the findings and concluding remarks. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Although the spatial mismatch hypothesis (SMH) has been studied extensively, 
no consensus on the causes the spatial mismatch has yet been reached.  Jencks and Meyer 
(1990), Holzer (1991), Kain (1992), Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist (1998) present rich and 
detailed literature reviews of spatial mismatch studies.  While the early studies on SMH 
mostly establish the existence of spatial mismatch, recent studies focus on the reasons for 
its persistence.  Most of these latter studies agree that spatial mismatch persists because 
inner-city minorities are not able to relocate in the presence of extensive job 
decentralization. 
Relatively few studies have dealt with the ability of low-income, inner-city 
minorities to adjust to a new residential location due to shifts in employment 
opportunities. Martin (2001, 2004) draws attention to the big picture by examining the 
shifts in job opportunities and residential locations. Employing county-level data of the 
50 most populated cities in the United States, Martin (2001) investigated how inner-city 
black residents react to shifts in job opportunities and found a low adjustment rate. 
Specifically, his findings show that employment opportunities shift far away from low-
income, inner-city minorities and that the residential location shifts of low-income, inner-
city minorities do not counterbalance these employment shifts.  In a follow-up study, 
Martin (2004) examined the total number of both employment and population shifts 
between 1970 and 2000 and compared them with the number of population and 
employment shifts of blacks.  Unlike the shifts in the population and employment of the 
latter, he finds a divergence between total population shifts and employment shifts. This 
result is consistent with the finding of a low adjustment to residential location rate of 
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minorities.  Stoll’s (1998) findings support this argument. He finds that a higher level of 
job decentralization has a strong and negative effect on young black and Latino male’s 
incidence of joblessness and duration of unemployment. However, neither Martin (2001, 
2004) nor Stoll (1998) considered the potential simultaneity bias between spatial 
mismatch and job decentralization. Stoll (2006) corrected for this problem by utilizing 
the instrumental variable approach, which controls the potential simultaneity bias 
between the job sprawl and the spatial mismatch that minorities face. Stoll reported a 
strong negative impact of job sprawl on blacks’ spatial mismatch even after controlling 
for the two-way direction, which showed that the control of simultaneity did not generate 
results contradicting those of prior studies. The literature suggests four primary reasons 
for the poor residential location adjustment of minorities:  
i) The existence of barriers such as housing and labor market segregation.  
ii) The negative net gain of moving because of the high risk and high cost 
associated with moving to the suburbs. 
iii) The high cost of searching for a suburban job. 
iv) The high number of benefits of living in a familiar neighborhood (i.e., social 
capital) 
 
Barriers  
The first reason for minorities’ lack of residential adjustment is the barriers they 
face in their adjustment process. These barriers such as housing segregation (Yinger, 
1995), labor market segregation (Zenou, 2002), and higher search and transportation 
costs (Patacchini & Zenou, 2005), among others, keep low-income, inner-city minorities 
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far from job opportunities. Holzer, Ihlanfeldt, and Sjoquist (1994) conducted one of the 
earliest studies that discuss barriers as grounds for the persistence of spatial mismatch. 
Their findings show that blacks are not able to offset the negative effects of job 
decentralization due to the housing segregation they face, and thus spatial mismatch 
persists.  
Although studies on the spatial mismatch hypothesis originated with an empirical 
question, recent research has theoretically expanded the boundaries of the original 
hypothesis.  One of the earliest studies by Arnott (1998)  attempted to explain the 
theoretical background of the spatial mismatch problem.  In the study, he highlighted the 
difficulties of job decentralization and racial segregation may not be exogenous variables, 
as treated in Kain’s (1968) seminal paper. For example, lower transportation costs may 
be the source of job decentralization, but at the same time, they would increase the utility 
level of inner-city minorities. Brueckner and Martin (1997) developed a theoretical model 
that would ascertain whether the theoretical foundations of the hypothesis were consistent 
with the empirical literature. They found that restrictions such as housing discrimination 
exclude black inner-city residents from suburban job districts, which is consistent with 
prior empirical studies. Brueckner and Zenou (2003) utilized both a minimum wage 
model and an efficiency wage model to investigate the effects of housing discrimination 
on the wages and unemployment rates of inner-city blacks. They concluded that for both 
models, this group faces more negative labor outcomes than their suburban counterparts.   
Zax and Kain (1996) conducted a unique study in which they exploited the natural 
experiment approach to analyze the responses of blacks to job suburbanization after one 
large inner-city company moved to Dearborn from Detroit in 1974. They looked into 
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employee files from 1971 to 1976 to distinguish the impact of the company’s move on 
different individuals.  As the company announced the move two years prior to the move, 
Zax and Kain were able to examine the adjustment process of its employees. They argued 
that the move was more advantageous for whites than blacks since the new neighborhood 
provided better options for white employees but restricted the relocation possibilities for 
blacks due to segregation.   Although they found an increase in commuting distance and 
commuting time for everyone, this finding was mostly the result of the tendency for 
whites to substitute increased commuting time with better housing by moving far away 
from the company.  By contrast, the rate of blacks who quit their jobs due to the 
relocation and increased commuting costs rose.  In fact, about 11 % quit their jobs.  
Employing the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Ross (1998) analyzed the 
likelihood that individuals will change residence when they change employment, 
controlling for racial differences. He found that the spatial distribution of jobs affects the 
coinciding job and residence changes; however, race does not explain this effect by itself. 
He concluded that the reason why inner-city minorities may not change residence is 
solely related to job decentralization. 
A common complication in residential segregation analysis is that households 
choose their residential location voluntarily, and therefore, this choice is mostly 
endogenous.  Using 1990 PUMS data, Cutler and Glaeser (1997) addressed the issue of 
endogeneity, discussed in prior studies, by utilizing an instrumental variable approach. 
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Their results, which are consistent with those of the prior studies, show that residential 
segregation has an adverse effect on the job accessibility of segregated residents.5   
While the prior literature usually agreed on the mechanism of the effect of 
housing segregation on labor market outcomes for minorities, no consensus was reached 
on the mechanism of labor market segregation. Theoretical studies generally use the 
“efficient wage” approach, in which commuting cost is capitalized under the suburban 
wage rate.  The costs of both commuting and searching for a suburban job reduce the 
utility of getting a suburban job.  Similarly, Stoll (2005) argued that inner-city minorities 
may face higher search costs due to the skill mismatch, which can be defined as the 
disparity between the skills required in a job and those possessed by the applicant. If such a 
disparity exists, then the applicant may have to settle for either a job that requires lower skills or 
no job at all  until he or she finds one that matches his/her skills.  Prior literature has argued that 
skill mismatch is one of the primary reasons for the rate and duration of unemployment (Pastor, 
2000; Michael A. Stoll, 2005). Stoll (2005) added a geographical perspective to the existing 
skill mismatch literature in order to explain the poor labor market outcomes of inner-city 
minority residents, arguing that although jobs in inner cities require higher-level skills, 
the labor market of inner cities consist primarily of low-skilled minorities. Stoll 
combined data sets from the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality and the Multi-City 
Employer Surveys for Los Angeles and Atlanta.  He found a skill mismatch between 
inner-city minorities and corresponding job opportunities. His findings also showed that 
less-educated blacks with access to automobiles tend to search in areas where low-skilled 
jobs are concentrated; confirming the finding that such access reduces search costs. 
                                                 
5 See Ihlanfeldt (1999); Raphael and Stoll (2001); Raphael, Stoll and Holzer (2000); Stoll 
(1998) ; Zenou (2002); Stoll (2005); Stoll (2006) for additional studies 
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Houston (2005), on the other hand, argued that the skills mismatch perspective fails to 
explain the problem, as it predominantly focuses on the supply side of the labor market 
rather than on the geography of unemployment and assumes a high degree of 
occupational and spatial mobility in the labor market.   Instead, Houston claims that the 
spatial mismatch hypothesis, although acknowledging the importance of the skills 
mismatch perspective, better addresses the problem. As a third explanation, Zenou  
(2002) approaches the problem from the point of view of firms, arguing that they are 
reluctant to hire workers who reside far from a job since they assume that commuting 
tires workers and reduces their productivity.   
Access to certain transportation modes is another crucial factor that might cause 
and/or remedy the spatial mismatch problem; however, studies on the impact of the use 
of transportation produce mixed results. The significance of transportation modes is 
mostly based on the belief that higher access to transportation reduces the effect of 
segregation on inner-city minorities, and therefore reduces the probability of mismatch. 
Access to automobiles might reduce mismatch in two ways by reducing the time cost of 
transportation and by increasing the efficiency of the job search. Patacchini and Zenou 
(2005) developed a theoretical model in which whites and blacks differ in their mode of 
transportation. While whites have access to private cars, blacks use public transportation, 
so they argue that the differentiation in transportation causes a disparity in the search 
costs, which favors whites. They also argue that higher commuting time causes poor job 
search results. The authors, after testing these arguments using employment data from 
England, confirmed the hypotheses that both access to private cars and lower commuting 
time to jobs increase the intensity of a job search.  
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Raphael and Stoll (2001) employed the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation data set to investigate whether access to an automobile increases the 
probability of employment among inner city residents. In order to explain the narrowing 
gap between minorities and whites, the authors analyzed if the return of access to 
automobiles is higher for minorities. They also repeated the same analysis in areas where 
the effect of spatial mismatch is severe. Their findings are consistent with the premises of 
the spatial mismatch hypothesis such that automobile ownership produces a higher return 
for inner city minorities, while the difference in the return is highest in areas where the 
effect of spatial mismatch is severe. Holzer, Quigley, and Raphael (2003) used a natural 
experiment approach to show the effect of access to transportation. They investigated 
whether the probability of being hired increases with the introduction of public 
transportation in the San Francisco Bay area. They reported a considerable increase in 
probability of being employed for those who live very close to newly-introduced modes 
of public transportation. Contradictory to the premise of the Spatial Mismatch 
Hypothesis, Taylor and Ong (1995) found convergence in the commuting time of whites 
and blacks, but both increased over time. A recent study conducted by Johnson (2006) 
provides theoretical and empirical support for the impact of transportation on the Spatial 
Mismatch Hypothesis.  Johnson introduced a new measure for job accessibility that 
includes rich and detailed information about geographic measures. Employing the Multi-
City Study of Urban Inequality (MCSUI) Household and Employer Survey, he found that 
housing segregation, combined with poor or costly public transportation opportunities, 
contribute to negative labor market outcomes for inner-city minorities. He found that 
households are either less likely to search for farther job opportunities or, even if they do 
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search less likely to accept jobs far from their residential locations. Dawkins et al. (2005) 
showed that automobile access decreases the duration of unemployment for blacks; 
however, living in a poor neighborhood lessens the impact of automobile access.  
The underlying premise of the barrier approach is that it assumes that all 
households want to move closer to job opportunities. Although the studies mentioned 
above provide strong evidence of the impact of barriers on residential mobility, since they 
start with such a strong assumption, they fail to take into account that households might 
intentionally choose to stay in inner cities. In other words, residential relocation may 
have hidden costs, so staying in a current neighborhood might be the most favorable 
choice for a household. The other three reasons why minorities do not adjust well to their 
residential locations relax this assumption and focus on the costs of residential relocation. 
 
Risky Moving  
For inner-city minorities, residential relocation to the suburbs represents a trade-
off, even without barriers, between the attraction of the suburbs and their close proximity 
to job opportunities and the relatively higher land rent with less housing mostly due to 
existing barriers such as zoning regulations.  Inner cities, on the other hand, offer 
relatively higher rates and a longer duration of unemployment but more access to lower-
rent housing. In other words, while the same amount of money is buying extra housing in 
the inner cities, it also increases the probability or the duration of unemployment.  
Analyzing this dilemma, Gobillon, Selod and Zenou (2005) concluded that the market 
could consist of two distinct equilibria for unemployed and employed workers: an 
“integrated city equilibrium” and a “spatial mismatch equilibrium.”  In an integrated city 
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equilibrium, unemployed workers reside closer to job opportunities (in the suburbs), 
whereas in a spatial mismatch equilibrium, unemployed workers reside far away from job 
opportunities (in inner cities). In order to observe an integrated city equilibrium, the 
number of expected benefits of residing closer to job opportunities, such as higher wages 
and a higher probability of being employed, should be higher than the number of 
expected costs such as relocation and commuting costs. Otherwise, if commuting costs 
exceed the expected returns, employed workers bid up the unemployment workers’ bid 
rent function, and thus they reside closer to the suburban center, which leads to the spatial 
mismatch equilibrium.  
 The spatial mismatch equilibrium is consistent with the spatial mismatch 
hypothesis such that residential and labor market segregation leads to extra costs for 
inner-city minority residents, making inner city locations favorable to suburban locations.   
Similarly, Smith and Zenou (2003) asserted that inner-city minority residents may 
voluntarily choose to reside far from job opportunities, emphasizing the trade-off 
between short-run and long-run gains of relocation. In the short-run, residing closer to job 
opportunities can be costly due to the low housing consumption and high land rent, but it 
may provide greater job opportunities in the long run. In contrast, residing far from job 
opportunities is an advantageous in the short run due to high housing consumption and 
low rent, but it reduce the probability of employment. Smith and Zenou concluded that 
inner city minorities may choose low rent and large housing opportunities over a higher 
probability of finding a job, which may lead to lower search intensity for inner-city 
minority residents. Gabriel and Rosenthal’s (1996) fixed-effect commute time model 
supports the above mentioned theoretical arguments. Using the 1985 and 1989 American 
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Housing Surveys, Gabriel and Rosenthal examined whether quality adjusted housing 
prices, earnings, and neighborhood benefits partially offset the negative impact of 
housing segregation.  Although they found longer commutes for blacks, neighborhood 
benefits and housing prices reduces their impact. 
To extend the incomplete compensation approach, this study asserts that the risk 
associated with residential mobility may prevent inner-city residents from adjusting their 
residential locations. Although the prior literature distinguished between migration and 
intra-urban residential mobility, as the factors affecting each differ (Boehm, Herzog, & 
Schlottmann, 1991), both types of relocation have include some common factors.  Like 
migration, residential mobility can be seen as an investment in human capital, and people 
relocate only if their anticipated net gain is positive.6 However, the costs and benefits of 
relocation can be observed in either the short or long-run, the characteristics of which 
may cause a negative net gain from migration (Tunali, 2000). Several factors could cause 
a negative net gain.  First, a household may not have adequate information about a new 
neighborhood, so they could miscalculate the costs and benefits. Accordingly, a 
household may become unhappy in a new neighborhood and want to relocate again. 
Second, although a large expected short- run payoff of moving may attract a household, 
the probability of receiving that payoff may be low.   If so, migration could be described 
as a “lottery” such that only some movers benefit (Tunali, 2000).  
Individuals also have to consider potential costs such as losing their job at a new 
workplace, the cost of searching for a subsequent job while residing in a suburb, and the 
probability of repeated moves, if necessary. Finding a job could be seen as a short-run 
payoff that could cover some of these costs.  However, uncertainty still exists, at least 
                                                 
6 See Gobillon and LeBlanc(2003); Axelsson and Westerlund(1998). 
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with respect to the likelihood of keeping that job. Tunali (2000) stated that residential 
relocation is a risky undertaking, and the risks associated with relocation are a result of 
uncertain returns as well as uncertain costs.  Some recent studies deal with such 
uncertainties. O’Connell (1997) used a dynamic optimizing model that incorporated 
future and present uncertainties and concluded that in individuals’ migration decisions, 
future uncertainties weigh more heavily than present ones. Employing PSID data, Kan 
(2002) found that uncertainty about a job location reduces the likelihood of a household’s 
actual move but increases the expectations of a move.  Kan (2003) presented evidence 
that risk aversion can discourage households from making any job and residential 
location change. Utilizing a dynamic system in which households decide their job and 
residential location jointly, Kan found that a higher level of risk aversion discourages 
households from making any changes. He also compares the impact of risk aversion on a 
single job or residential change and joint changes, finding a low likelihood of choosing 
joint changes among the risk-avoiding individuals. 
Some of the costs households face in their relocation process may also be 
irreversible. The notion of irreversibility has not been used widely in urban economics 
literature. With an irreversible investment model, Titman (1985) explained the existence 
of vacant land in downtown Los Angeles, where the land values are very high. Either 
high potential value of land in the future or high uncertainty at present causes investors to 
postpone their actions. Investors prefer to build a parking lot rather than a high-rise 
building because it is relatively less costly to build and to demolish. Bulan et al. (2006) 
tested a similar argument: whether uncertainty delays investment in condominium 
development in Canada. Their findings showed that the options model explains the 
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behavior of developers better than alternative explanations such as the simple risk 
aversion approach.7  
The irreversible investment theory has also been used to explain international 
migration.  Burda (1993, 1995) pioneered related studies, showing that immediate 
migration form East to West Germany did not take place after reunification despite large 
wage differentials across regions. Following Burda’s studies, Locher (2002), Vergalli and 
Moretto (2005), and Vergalli (2006) provided evidence that community ties reduce 
uncertainty about the future, and therefore, increase the probability of migration. To date, 
no studies have utilized the real options approach in analyzing intra-urban residential 
location. 
  
Job Search 
One notable result of extensive decentralization of jobs and the lack of residential 
location adjustment by inner-city minorities is the gap between the search behavior 
pattern of inner city residents and that of suburban residents. The SMH asserts that inner-
city minorities have to search in extended areas, which increases the costs of a search 
while reducing the efficiency of a search. Stoll (1999) tested this argument, using the 
1994 Los Angeles Survey of Urban Inequality. His findings support the premises of the 
spatial mismatch hypothesis that blacks and Latinos search more extensively than whites. 
Stoll also provides evidence that the extensive search pattern increases the probability of 
employment; however, the net gain from such employment is relatively small due to the 
higher cost of an extensive job search.  
                                                 
7 For additional reading see Capozza and Li (1994)  
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Coming to a similar conclusion to that of Stoll, Coulson, Laing, and Wang (2001), 
in their theoretical paper, adopted a search-equilibrium model that identified the 
difficulties that inner-city workers face when they attempt to obtain information about 
suburban jobs. The authors argued that discrimination in the labor market cannot fully 
explain spatial mismatch since it would suggest that suburban employers discriminate 
more than inner-city employers.  However, current evidence does not support this 
argument. Similarly, commuting costs would not be a major issue since the wage 
elasticity of labor force participation is low.  According to Coulson, Laing, and Wang 
(2001), the answer lies within the job search pattern of inner-city workers; that is, 
whereas inner-city workers search for jobs in both the inner cities and the suburbs, 
suburban workers search only in the suburbs.  
With regard to whether the spatial distribution of job opportunities or barriers 
such as housing segregation increase search costs, studies produce mixed results. 
According to Stoll and Raphael (2000), residential segregation, not the spatial 
distribution of jobs, triggers high search costs. Using the Los Angeles Study of Urban 
Inequality data, they examined the spatial job search pattern of blacks, Latinos and whites 
in Los Angeles.  They found that these two groups, unlike whites, search in areas where 
the employment growth is relatively low. They interpret this finding as a consequence of 
residential segregation. Searching in areas with few job opportunities reduces the quality 
of the job search. Stoll and Raphael argued that the quality of a job search has a stronger 
effect than social networks or job search methods on the likelihood of securing 
employment. Ihlanfeldt’s combination of the barrier and spatial job distribution 
arguments adds one more characteristic to the job search behavior of inner-city 
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minorities. Ihlanfeldt (1997)used the Atlanta component of the Multi-City Study of 
Urban Inequality to show that inner city residents do not have enough information about 
the spatial distribution of new job openings for workers without college degrees in their 
metropolitan area. He noted that all inner-city residents suffer from lack of adequate 
information, but inner city minorities suffer even more. This result suggests that 
residentially segregated inner-city minorities might have relatively higher search costs 
due to poor available information about new job openings that might match their skills.  
Another aspect of a costly job search is the duration of unemployment. Rogers 
(1997) constructed a unique access index combining individual characteristics, municipal 
level employment, and a commute time matrix and investigates how spatial distribution 
of jobs influence an individual’s search behavior and employment duration. She found 
that a longer duration of employment in neighborhoods far from new job opportunities, 
which is consistent with the premises of the SMH.  
Kleit (2001) examines the effect of social networks on the job searches of public 
housing residents. She argued that families in diverse neighborhoods have greater access 
to diverse sources of information; however, they use neighborhood sources less 
frequently in their job search than families in clustered neighborhoods. 
 
Social Capital 
Inner-city residents may not search for jobs in the suburbs because of the likely 
cost of losing established links to the community, simply identified as “neighborhood 
attachment.” Coleman (1988), who coined the term “social capital,” argued that these 
established links help build human capital by providing a social support system for 
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children, activating their social skills. Therefore, social capital should be treated as 
economic and human capital. Social capital has been defined in multiple ways by various 
scholars. Some identify it as “civic engagement” and “social connectedness” (Putnam, 
1993) or a representation of “trust” and “civic norms” (Knack & Keefer, 1997). Others 
identify it as a “social component” of human capital (Glaeser et al., 2002). Durlauf and 
Fafchamps (2004) summarized the underlying three key ideas of social capital:  one is 
that social capital creates positive externality for an individual; another is that externality 
can be achieved via shared values (i.e., trust); and that the existence of informal 
organizations helps individuals share values.  
The common element in these definitions is the interaction between individuals 
and their neighborhoods. Evidence from recent studies suggests that neighborhoods 
strongly influence the behaviors of residents.8  According to prior studies, neighborhoods 
have an effect on outcomes such as teen pregnancies, and dropping out of high-school 
(Crane, 1991; Harding, 2003), health (Katz, Kling, & Liebman, 2001), and educational 
attainment (Aaronson, 1998; Crane, 1991; Ginther et al., 2000), crime (Katz et al., 2001), 
and employment (Rosenbaum & Harris, 2001). 
Although no consensus on how neighborhoods affect an individual’s outcomes 
has been reached, the effects can be classified into two categories:  Direct effects, such as 
the effect of having better schools or a safer environment in the neighborhood on 
individual’s outcomes, and indirect effects such as the effect of a better neighborhood on 
parents’ characteristics, which affects children’s outcomes. Brooks-Gunn et al. (1997) 
summarize the potential mechanisms of how a neighborhood might affect an individual’s 
                                                 
8 See Ginther, Haveman, Wolfe (2000) for a detailed literature review of neighborhood effects on 
an individual’s behavior. 
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outcome. They separated effects into those on children and those on adolescents.  A 
neighborhood affects children via parental characteristics, economics resources, and 
parental behavior during childhood. In addition to these three mediums, opportunities in 
the neighborhood, school quality, and peer groups play important roles in determinating 
an adolescent’s outcomes.  
However, the endogenous feature of location choices, i.e., the unobservable 
characteristics of individuals that may affect the location choice as well as labor market 
outcomes, make identifying the effect of a neighborhood on an individual’s outcomes 
difficult. Researchers address the problem by either utilizing the instrumental variable 
approach 9 or using a randomized experiment such as the Moving to Opportunity (MTO)  
Program.  Participants in the MTO program were selected from high-poverty public 
housing areas. Eligible volunteers were randomly assigned one of three groups: 
experimental, comparison, or control. Families in the experimental group received 
housing vouchers eligible for use in low-poverty neighborhoods.  Families in the 
comparison group received traditional housing vouchers without neighborhood 
restrictions (Section 8).  Families in the control group did not receive either voucher, but 
were still eligible for public housing.  A randomized feature of the program removed the 
endogeneity in location choice; hence, the effect of other factors such as neighborhood 
can be observed. Johnson, Ladd and Ludwig (2002) reviewed the effect of residential 
mobility programs on the urban poor. They included three programs (MTO, Gautreaux, 
and Yonkers) in their analysis and summarized the empirical evidence on different 
outcomes such as health, education, the labor market, criminal behavior, and residential 
                                                 
9 Cutler and Gleaser, (1997) 
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mobility, concluding that the neighborhood plays an important role in more positive 
individual outcomes.10 
Aaronson  (1998) employed a different methodology to overcome possible bias 
from endogeneity. He employed a sample of families with more than one child and those 
with children separated when they were less than three years old. His family-fixed effect 
results showed that neighborhoods affected the children’s educational attainment. 
Frenette et al. (2004) employed longitudinal tax data of Canada for characteristics 
of the duration of residence in low-income neighborhoods. Particularly, they utilized a 
standard hazard modeling framework and found negative duration dependence in low-
income neighborhoods. They also found that both non-economic factors such as being 
older and having young children and economic factors such as facing higher 
unemployment rates are associated with a longer duration of residence in low-income 
neighborhoods. Quillian (2003), using the PSID data set, analyzed the characteristics of 
duration in low-income neighborhoods and the dynamics of entry and exit from poor 
neighborhoods. He used previous definitions for poor neighborhoods, that is, if more than 
40 % of a neighborhood is poor, the neighborhood is considered “extremely poor,” and if 
more than 20, it is considered “poor.” He found that blacks stay longer in poor 
neighborhoods, they commonly re-enter the poor neighborhood following an exit, and if a 
female is the head of household with a low income, they stay longer in the neighborhood.  
A few studies looked at the effect of moving on social capital. Pettit and 
McLanahan (2003) employed MTO participants in Los Angeles and investigated the 
                                                 
 
10 See Kling, Ludwig, and Katz (2005), Katz, Kling, and Liebman (2001) and Ludwig, Duncan, 
and Hirshfield  (2001) for detailed information about the effect of neighborhood on different 
outcomes. 
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answers to two questions in their analysis:  whether moving reduces the social capital and 
whether the location to which they moved creates an additional difference.  In response to 
the former question, they found mixed results, one of which was that moving does not 
affect children’s after-school activities, but it reduces parental interaction. They used 
three social variables as measures for their analysis:  parents’ interaction with the parents 
of their children’s friends, a child’s participation of after-school activities, and the total 
number of after-school activities in which the child participates. 
Pribesh and Downey (1999) used a longitudinal design by employing the National 
Education Longitudinal Study data of 1988 and those of the follow-up study in 1992. 
Their social capital measures contained a variety of ties that a child can establish such as 
student-school ties (i.e., school activities in which the child has participated), student-
community ties (i.e., community activities in which the child has participated), student-
peer ties (i.e., the effect of peers on the child’s decisions), student-parent ties (i.e., 
discussions between parents and their child), and parent-parent ties (i.e., whether parents 
know the parents of their child’s friends).  They find that relocation reduces social 
connections for children, which negatively affect the educational attainment. In a more 
recent study, Glaeser et al. (2002) employed data from the General Social Survey from 
1972 to 1988 to investigate the accumulation of an individual’s social capital. They found 
that their social capital measure, membership to an organization, “depreciates” when their 
households leave the neighborhood. They attribute this finding to the strong negative 
relationship between mobility and social capital since their social capital measure 
demonstrates a negative relationship even though it lacks geographic identification.  
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The negative effect of moving on social capital might create a reluctance to move 
among inner-city residents.  This reluctance can be observed in the search behaviors of 
inner city residents.  Sjoquist (2001), using the Greater Atlanta Neighborhood Study data, 
presented evidence that inner-city minorities do not search for suburban jobs if they feel 
unaccepted socially by those in suburban locations. Dawkins (2005) studied the tendency 
of households to live in neighborhoods that have racial and ethnic composition similar to 
that of their childhood neighborhood. His study examined if residential segregation 
persists across generations. After controlling for the determinants of residential location 
choice such as income, education, and gender, he found that households live in 
neighborhoods with very similar characteristics to those of their childhood. Bayer et al. 
(2005) utilized a new empirical research design using a restricted version of the 1990 US 
Census of Population data for the Boston metropolitan area. They examined the effect of 
informal interaction on labor market outcomes and found that residing on the same or a 
nearby block increased the probability of working together. Using the Los Angeles 
Metropolitan Area survey data, Clark (1992) investigated the residential preferences of 
minorities. His results showed that households are more likely to reside in a 
neighborhood largely comprised of their own race. 
Dawkins (2006) published the most recent study on the topic of social capital and 
mobility. He examined the impact of intra-neighborhood social ties on the inter-
neighborhood residential mobility of families with children.  In his study, Dawkins 
employed the 1997 and 2002 Child Development Supplements of the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics and concluded that social ties play a major role in families’ residential 
mobility decisions. In order to measure social ties in a neighborhood, Dawkins used two 
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groups of variables. The first measured the availability of a social network in the 
neighborhood, including variables such as the number of relatives per neighborhood 
family, the number of good friends per neighborhood family, and the number of close 
friends to the children of each neighborhood family. The second group measured the 
availability of social resources, including variables such as “whether families provided or 
received in-kind assistance or emotional support.”  This study, however, defined 
“neighborhood” differently from other studies.  It used a self-reported neighborhood 
definition in which neighborhood was defined as “the surrounding locations within a 15-
minute walk.”11  
This study contributes to existing literature in several ways. First, it introduces 
alternative approach to the existing literature, one that may help to identify the 
mechanism of spatial mismatch. To date, none of the studies have focused on social 
capital as a reason for the spatial mismatch problem.12  This study, on the other hand, 
considers social capital the primary reason for voluntary stay in a neighborhood.   
Second, no study has used the irreversibility concept to explain a household’s 
intra-urban residential mobility behavior.  Although the concept has been used to explain 
international migration, especially in Europe, it is novel to the intra-urban residential 
location literature13. One way to interpret the notion of irreversibility in the intra-urban 
residential mobility framework is that households consider the value of the option of 
                                                 
11 Dawkins restricted his sample with the respondents who answered “What do you consider to be 
neighborhood?” question as “within a 15-minute walk from home or smaller”. 
 
12 The closest study is Sjoquist (2001);  however, he considers social unacceptability as a   
consequence of the segregation of minorities. 
 
13 See Burda (1993, 1995) Locher (2002), Vergalli and Moretto (2005), and Vergalli (2006) for 
an explanation of the use of irreversible investment in international migration literature. 
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moving in their residential mobility decisions.   In other words, each household assigns a 
different value to a move, or a threshold value.  If this is the case, minorities with a low 
threshold value would probably choose to move, which explains the rising percentage of 
minorities who have left their neighborhood for the suburbs. 
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CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL MODEL 
In this section, I formulate a search model in which individuals search jobs and 
residential locations in two places- suburb and inner-city- simultaneously. The model is 
based on the iterated model of Van Ommeren et al. (1997, 2000) and on Damm and 
Rosholm (2003).  
 
Summary of Related Model 
Van Ommoren et al. (1997, 2000) employ a dynamic search-theoretical 
perspective and derive optimal strategies for both employed and unemployed individuals. 
In their model, individuals maximize their utility either by changing their employment 
status or by changing their residential location. Individuals observe exogenous job or 
residential offers, and either accept or reject the offers depending on the reservation 
wages or reservation place utilities. The reservation place utility and the reservation wage 
are determined by labor and housing market characteristics. If wage (place utility) is 
higher than the reservation wage (reservation place utility), then the individual accepts 
the job offer (residence offer). The model also takes into account one-time cost of 
residence change, which is exogenously determined.14 A job is characterized by wage and 
commuting distance and a residential location is characterized by place utility and 
commuting distance.  
The dynamic framework of the model allows consideration of future options such 
as subsequent moves. This feature separates their model from Damm and Rosholm’s 
model such that finding a job does not end individuals’ search for jobs. Individuals 
                                                 
14 Van Ommeren  et al. (1997) list some components of this cost such as real estate agent fees, 
cost of furnishing new dwelling, effort of moving, and psychic costs. 
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always chase the optimal job and residential package regardless of their employment 
status. Van Ommeren et al.’s model includes an additional parameter that represents the 
probability of being fired. Inclusion of this parameter provides a link between current and 
future time periods. Another implication of the dynamic framework is that it allows the 
possibility of moving back to the original location, which makes the first move 
reversible. For example, an individual may move to a suburb for a job, and then return to 
the inner-city later on if he or she loses the job. 
Their comparative statics show that non-employed inner-city residents with 
higher place utilities are attached to the neighborhood, which makes them less inclined to 
accept a job offer if it requires a residential relocation. Furthermore, Van Ommeren et al. 
argue that higher unemployment benefits for non-employed inner-city residents make 
them more inclined to move after they accept the job offer. 
Additional finding of Van Ommeren et al. is the ambiguous effect of the 
probability of losing a job on residential relocation decision. If current commuting 
distance is zero and the probability of losing job is high, then moving the residence would 
not change the commuting distance (cost) in case of losing the job. Alternatively, if both 
current commuting distance and the probability of losing a job are high, then individuals 
are less likely to move since the commuting distance (cost) will reduce by a move to 
unemployment. Van Ommeren et al. conclude that higher current place utility would 
diminish both the motivation to accept a job outside the neighborhood and the motivation 
to relocate the residence. 
Damm and Rosholm (2003) use a similar model to investigate the effect of 
dispersal policies for refugee immigrants on their labor market integration.  Damm and 
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Rosholm’s model departs from Van Ommeren et al. in several ways.  First, Damm and 
Rosholm set two different markets: Local and National, where the national market is 
defined as that outside of the local market. Individuals may search local jobs as well as 
national jobs. Due to the separation of markets, Damm and Rosholm utilize commuting 
distance implicitly. Commuting from the local market to the national market is highly 
costly, therefore is not allowed in the model. Second, a job offer from the national market 
comes with the residence offer. Third, and a vital departure from Van Ommeren et al., is 
the reversibility condition. The search for a new job stops if an individual finds a job. 
This condition eliminates the possibility of moving back to the original location, which 
makes the initial move irreversible. 
Damm and Rosholm’s model shows that non-employed individuals have a lower 
reservation wage for local jobs relative to their reservation wage for national jobs. They 
also show that an increase in current place utility increases the reservation place utility 
and the reservation wage for national jobs. Intuitively, non-employed individuals with 
higher current place utility have less reason to accept a job outside of the current location.  
 
Basic Model Structure 
Both Van Ommeren et al. and Damm and Rosholm present a useful path in a 
simultaneous residential search and job search framework. The model in this dissertation 
is a combination of these two models, but is closer to Damm and Rosholm’s model with 
its feature of irreversibility. In contrast to Damm and Rosholm, my search model takes 
into account intra-urban job and residential markets (suburban and urban) instead of local 
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and national markets. Commuting is allowed between markets; therefore, job and 
residence offers do not arrive jointly.  
In a standard job search model, an unemployed worker either chooses to stay 
unemployed and search possible employment options or accepts a wage offer. Initially, 
offer arrival rates of jobs and residences are determined by some exogenous factors such 
as job availability and housing supply, and some endogenous factors such as individual 
characteristics. It is also possible to set job and residence arrival rates as a function of 
search effort; however, in the model I ignore the effort component, which will be added 
below. 
The model considers an unemployed inner-city resident who makes choices 
regarding job and location, i.e., the inner-city and suburb.15 The simple model assumes a 
continuous utility function that depends on the arrival rate of jobs, the unemployment 
benefit, local and suburban wages, and local and suburban place utility. First, using the 
linear instantaneous utility function, I compare the reservation wages. Afterward, I add an 
exogenous search effort to simple model and the choice is made. I then show how local 
place utility and effort affect individual’s decision on job and residence by affecting the 
reservation wages and the present value of being unemployed. 
In the model, and following Van Ommeren et al., an individual’s utility is additive 
and a function of wage and place utility. A job is characterized solely by wage, and an 
individual’s utility is increasing in wage and place utility. I consider an unemployed 
individual who lives in the inner city. I assume that this person continuously searches for 
                                                 
15 In this dissertation, inner-city, local, and the central city are used interchangeably. 
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a job in both the local job market and the suburban job market, and engages one of the 
following options: 
i) Stay unemployed (reject all wage offers), and receive unemployment 
benefit and place utility. 
ii) Accept a local wage offer (Stayers). 
iii) Accept a suburban wage offer and either move to suburb (Movers) or stay 
at current location and commute to the job (Commuters) 
iv) Move to suburb without accepting a job offer. 
Before accepting a job offer, an unemployed worker has utility  0arb +  , where 
b is the unemployment benefit, a  is a parameter, and 0r  is the local place utility. The 
individual will face two types of costs: Relocation cost (c1), which is a one-time cost of 
changing residence, and commuting cost (c2). I assume that the distance between inner-
city and suburb is fixed, and thus these costs are independent of commuting distance.  Job 
offers arrive according to a Poisson process; 1α , 2α , and 3α  are job arrival rates for local 
jobs, suburban jobs, and suburban residences, respectively. The model assumes a job 
search stops when a job offer is accepted, therefore only an unemployed individual 
searches for a job offer. The offers are randomly drawn from distributions defined as 
follows: place utility offers are random draws from marginal distribution with CDF 
)(rFr ; local job offers are random draws from marginal distribution with CDF )(wFw ; 
suburban job offers are random draws from joint place and wage distribution with CDF 
),(, ryF ry for Movers and CDF ),( 0ryFy for Commuters, where r is the place utility of 
new location, 0r  is the place utility of current location, w  is local wage, and y is 
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suburban wage. Every inner city resident get benefit 0r  from his neighborhood, while the 
benefit he gets from a suburban neighborhood is r . In central city, an unemployed 
individual gets the total of unemployment benefits (b ) as well as a portion of current 
neighborhood benefit ( 0ar ) instantly. The unemployment benefit (b ) includes any 
income associated with unemployment such as unemployment benefits, welfare benefits, 
the value of housework done in the house, and the value of leisure time spent.16 
Additionally, the flow value of being unemployed includes expected value of finding a 
local job and staying in the central city, expected value of finding a suburban job and 
either commuting or moving to suburb, and expected value of moving to suburb without 
finding a suburban job. 
The flow value of being unemployed in the central city at any moment denoted 
)( 0rVρ  is given in equation [1]: 
)]()(,0[max
)](),(),(),(,0[max
)](),(,0[max)(
013
02001,2
00100
rVcrVE
rVcryWrVcryWE
rVrwWEarbrV
r
ry
w
−−+
−−−−+
−++=
α
α
αρ
            (1) 
where w  and y are central city wage rate and suburban wage rate, respectively and ρ  is 
the discount rate. W represents the value of working and is a function of wage and place 
utility, V represents the value of being unemployed and is a function of place utility, and 
E  is expectation operator that takes expectation with respect to subscripted variable. In 
equation [1], first term, ( 0arb + ), is the instantaneous utility than an individual gets 
without accepting any offer. In shows an unemployed in inner-city can get 
                                                 
16 If an individual searches a job then the search cost (time and out-of-pocket costs) should be 
subtracted from unemployment benefit.  Search cost will be added to model below. 
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unemployment benefit and a fraction of place utility even without entertaining any job 
offer. The second term, ( )](),(,0[max 001 rVrwWEw −α ), represents the “option” value of 
getting another local job offer.  It is the arriving rate of local jobs times the expected 
surplus of a local job offer. The third term, ( )](),(),(),(,0[max 02001,2 rVcryWrVcryWE ry −−−−α ), 
is the “option” value of getting another suburban job offer.  It is the arriving rate of 
suburban jobs times the expected surplus of a suburban job offer. The third term has two 
separate components: the expected surplus of working in a suburban job by moving 
residence to the suburb and the expected surplus of working in a suburban job by 
commuting. The last term, ( )]()(,0[max 013 rVcrVEr −−α ), shows the “option” value of 
getting another suburban residence offer. It is the arriving rate of a residence offer times 
the expected surplus of a residential offer.  
The straightforward reading of the equation [1] is that an increase in current place 
utility ( 0r ) increases the present value of being unemployed ( 0
)(
0
0 >∂
∂
r
rV
)17. This implies 
that an unemployed individual with higher local place utility is more inclined to search 
for a local job rather than a suburban job. Entertaining a local job search would increase 
the option value of local job search and also would increase the instantaneous place 
utility.  
 In order to derive optimal strategies, several assumptions and the reservation 
values of job search need to be set down.  Let w  and y  be the average values of local 
wages and suburban wages, respectively.  The primary assumptions are that ywb << , 
                                                 
17 The derivation of 
0
0 )(
r
rV
∂
∂
can be found in comparative statics section of chapter 3. 
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and 0, >ρα i . An individual’s problem is to maximize the lifetime utility by accepting 
job or residence offers or staying unemployed. The values that make individuals 
indifferent between taking an offer and staying unemployed are referred as reservation 
values. *w  is the reservation wage for a local job offer for Stayers such that individuals 
would accept the offer if and only if *ww > ; ryR |  is the reservation wage of a suburban 
job offer for Movers such that individuals would accept the offer and reside in a new 
(suburban) location if and only if ryRy |> ; 0|ryR  is the reservation wage of a suburban job 
offer for Commuters  such that individuals would accept the offer and commute to new 
location if and only if 
0|ry
Ry > ; and *r  is the reservation value for suburban residence 
offer such that individuals would accept the offer if and only if *rr > . 
 Changing the surrounding (job or residence) is defined with a transition rate or 
hazard rate, which is identified as the product of the job (residence) arrival rate and the 
probability of accepting a job (residence) offer. Let jhλ  identify the transition rate, where j 
denotes job location (j=1,2 for local and suburban jobs, respectively) and h denotes 
residential location (h=1,2 for local and suburban jobs, respectively). The transition rates 
are given as: 
)](1[ *1
1
1 wFw−= αλ  is the transition (hazard)  rate into a local job for Stayers 
)](1[ |2
2
2 ryy RF−= αλ  is the transition (hazard) rate into a suburban job for Movers 
)](1[
0|3
2
1 ryy RF−= αλ  is the transition (hazard)  rate into a suburban job for Commuters 
)](1[ *42 rFr−= αλ  is the transition (hazard) rate into new residence. 
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Following Van Ommeren et al. (1997, 2000) and Damm and Rosholm (2003), I use 
reservation value properties and integration by parts to rewrite equation [1]:18 
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where μ  denotes the ratio of population that chooses to move to the suburb if a suburban 
job is taken in equilibrium and  ( μ−1 ) is the ratio of population that chooses to commute 
to suburb if a suburban job is taken.  
 
Reservation Wages 
Reservation wage of a local job is defined as the value at which an individual is 
indifferent between working in a local job or staying unemployed. Let 
)](),,([max)( 0rVrwWwJ = , that is the value of having an offer in the hand. Since the 
reservation wage is defined as the wage that an individual is indifferent between working 
and being unemployed, at reservation wage the value of working will be equal to value of 
being unemployed, )(),( 0rVrwW = . Since the value of working at reservation wage in 
                                                 
18 For any w : 
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Therefore, for every ∞→w , we have; 
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the local labor market is same as being unemployed in the central city, it is possible to 
write the equality as: 000 *)()*,( arwrVrwW +== ρρ  Rearranging the equation for the 
reservation wage of a local job gives 00 )(
1* arrVw −= ρ . Similarly, the other reservation 
wages are: 020|
1)(1
0
arcrVR ry −+= ρρ  for Commuters, and arcrVR ry −+= 10|
1)(1 ρρ for 
Movers. 
i) The difference between the reservation wages of Commuters and Stayers is: 
01])(1[]1)(1[* 200020| 0 >=−−−+=− carrVarcrVwR ry ρρρρ  
Intuition: High commuting cost increases the reservation wage for Commuters. 
Therefore, the individual’s probability of searching for a local job increases with the 
increase in commuting cost.  
ii) The difference between the reservation wages of Movers and Stayers is: 
)(1])(1[]1)(1[* 010010| rracarrVarcrVwR ry −+=−−−+=− ρρρρ  
Intuition: This expression is positive if rr >0 . It can be interpreted as high local place 
utility increases the cost of moving from the central city to the suburb, thus increasing the 
reservation wage for Movers. Similarly, high relocation cost increases the reservation 
value for Movers, which increases an individual’s probability of searching a local job. 
High relocation cost and high local place utility reduces the individual’s probability of 
moving to the suburb.  
iii) The difference between the reservation wages of Commuters and Movers is: 
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)()(1]1)(1[]1)(1[ 01210020|| 0 rraccarcrVarcrVRR ryry −+−=−+−−+=− ρρρρρ  
Intuition: This expression is positive if 0rr >  and 12 cc > . If local place utility exceeds 
the new residence’s place utility and relocation cost exceeds the commuting cost, then the 
reservation wage for Movers would increase reducing the probability of moving.  
 
Search Effort 
The framework introduced above is written under two main assumptions: 
i) Every individual put the same level of effort in the job search process 
ii) Job search effort does not vary across locations  
It is reasonable to assume that inclusion of job search effort brings extra costs 
(time and money) to an individual; however the effort also increases the probability of 
finding a job. Moreover, it seems reasonable to argue for an inner-city residents that 
searching for an inner-city job is less costly than searching for a suburban job and that 
individuals who have strong ties to the local neighborhood (high 0r ) would search more 
extensively in central city. Hence, I add an exogenous search effort to the model. Search 
effort can affect the flow value of being unemployed by affecting two main parameters: 
Higher search effort reduces the instant unemployment benefit (b ) by creating time and 
money cost, denoted )(es , and increases the number of job offers arriving. Let e be search 
effort of individual and let the job arrival rate be an increasing function of search effort, 
)(eα .  It is natural to assume that the marginal return of effort is decreasing, therefore 
0>′α and 0<′′α .  
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Individuals are allowed to put different levels of effort across location. Let Le  be 
the search effort to find a local job and Se be the search effort to find a suburban job. Let 
( SL ee −= 1 ).  This means that every individual has an equal amount of total search effort 
(unity in this case), however they differ by their allocation of this total search effort for 
local jobs and suburban jobs. Then, )(1 Leα is the arriving rate of local jobs when an 
unemployed put Le  amount of search for local jobs, and )(2 Leα  is the arriving rate of 
suburban jobs when an unemployed put Le  amount of search for local jobs (therefore the 
search effort for suburban job is 1- Le ). If we rewrite equation [2] by including Le  , then 
the equation becomes: 
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where 01 >′α  (higher search effort for local jobs increases the probability of having a 
local job offer), and 02 <′α ( higher search effort for local jobs decreases the probability 
of having a suburban job offer).  
 
Comparative Statics 
In this section, I present some comparative statics results. These comparative 
statics are helpful to show the role of local place utility and search effort on individual’s 
decision of accepting a local job or suburban job. 
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i) Flow value of being unemployed increases with local place utility, i.e., 
⎟⎟⎠
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⎛ >∂
∂
0
)(
0
0
r
rV . 
Damm and Rosholm (2003) present a detailed computation of 
0
0 )(
r
rV
∂
∂
 for the 
simple model. The only departure from their computation is that the model has 
commuting possibility in this analysis. The addition of commuters to the equation does 
not change the sign of
0
0 )(
r
rV
∂
∂
. Following Damm and Rosholm (2003), the equation for 
0
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∂
can be derived by using equation [3].19 
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Since both denominator and numerator are greater than zero, 
0
0 )(
r
rV
∂
∂
is positive. 
The interpretation of this result is straightforward such that flow value of being 
unemployed increases in local place utility.  
ii) Reservation value for suburban residence offer increases with local place utility, 
i.e., ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ >∂
∂ 0*
0r
r . 
Reservation place utility is defined as the place utility that an individual is 
indifferent in staying and moving out. Therefore, 10 )(*)( crVrV += , which shows that the 
value of living in a place with reservation place utility is equal to the sum of the value of 
                                                 
19For detailed derivation, see Damm and Rosholm (2003). 
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living in inner-city and moving cost. Comparative statics (i) presents that )(rV is 
increasing in 0r . Then it is possible to write 0
*
0
>∂
∂
r
r  (A. P. Damm, Rosholm M., 2003). 
This result has the clear-cut interpretation that higher local place utility increases the 
reservation value for moving from central city. 
iii) Local place utility increases the reservation wage of Movers, i.e., ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
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R ry  
The reservation wage for Movers is arcrVR ry −+= 10| 1)(1 ρρ . Since )(rV is 
increasing in 0r , then 0
0
| >∂
∂
r
R ry . Consistent with reservation wage analysis, higher local 
place utility increases the Movers’ reservation wage. In other words, higher place utility 
increases the attachment to the inner-city and therefore reduces the transition rate into a 
suburban job for Movers. 
iv) Reservation wage for local jobs decreases with local place utility, i.e., 0
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This comparative statics produced an expected outcome such that higher local 
place utility increases the reservation wage for local jobs, which increases the probability 
of accepting a local job. In other words, higher place utility increases the attachment to 
the inner-city and therefore increases the transition rate into a local job for Stayers. 
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v) The effect of local place utility on the reservation wage of Commuters, i.e., 
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 The sign of the numerator is ambiguous because the option value of residential 
search decreases with local place utility, the option value of getting another local job 
offer increases with local place utility, and the option value of getting another suburban 
job offer decreases with local place utility for Movers. 
vi) The effect of local search effort on flow value of being unemployed, 
i.e., ⎟⎟⎠
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The equation has three components: the effect of effort for local jobs on 
unemployment benefits, arrival rate of local jobs, and arrival rate of suburban job. The 
first term, the effect of search effort for local jobs on search cost, is zero since total 
search cost, which is equal to unity, does not change with Le .  Any increase in the search 
effort for local jobs reduces the arrival rate of suburban jobs, therefore, the second term, 
the effect of search effort for local jobs on the arrival rate of suburban jobs, is negative. 
On the other hand, any increase in the search effort for local jobs increases the arrival rate 
of local jobs. Hence, the third term, the effect of search effort for local jobs on the arrival 
rate of local jobs, is positive. The net effect is indeterminate. If the negative effect of 
searching extensively in local job market on the arrival rate of suburban jobs is higher 
than its positive effect on the arrival rate of local jobs, the flow value of being 
unemployed decreases with search effort for local jobs. It shows that searching in inner 
city extensively is reasonable if searching for a local job increases the option value of 
local jobs more than the reduction in option value of suburban jobs.  
These comparative statics results provide several helpful insights. First, the 
greater local place utility increases the flow value of being unemployed. This result is 
consistent with expectation. Those who have a strong attachment to their neighborhood 
have higher instant benefit even without engaging any job market activities. Second, 
higher place utility increases the reservation value for a suburban residence offer. It 
shows that the individuals with strong attachment to the neighborhood are less likely to 
move to another neighborhood. Third, the reservation wage of Movers increases with 
local place utility. It is intuitive since strong attachment to the local neighborhood makes 
individuals less inclined to accept a suburban job offer and move from local 
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neighborhood. Fourth, an increase in the local place utility reduces the local reservation 
wage. Those who have a strong attachment to their neighborhood are more likely to work 
in a local job market since their reservation wage is lower. In other words, the extra 
utility from living in a local neighborhood is a substitute for the wage lost by working in 
local job market. Fifth, the effect of local place utility on the reservation wage of 
Commuters is ambiguous. An increase in local place utility reduces the option value of 
moving from the neighborhood by increasing the reservation wages of Movers and 
reservation value of suburban residences. At the same time, higher local place utility 
increases the option value of working in the neighborhood. The net effect depends on 
these option values such that if the increase in the option value of working in a local 
neighborhood is higher than the decrease in option values of moving, then the reservation 
wage of Commuters would increase generating a lower probability for accepting a 
suburban job. Lastly, the effect of local search effort on flow value of being unemployed 
is ambiguous. Searching a job in the local job market extensively increases the option 
value of a getting local job and reduces then option value of getting a suburban job.  
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CHAPTER 4: DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
In previous chapter, the relationship between social capital and residential 
mobility is examined by theoretically. The theoretical model presented in Chapter 3 
shows that the individuals with higher local place utilities are less likely to move from 
their current neighborhoods. This chapter extends the findings of the theoretical model 
and focuses on the empirical relationship between social capital and the probability of 
moving. Simply, this chapter examines how social capital affects the probability of 
moving.  
This dissertation employs the Panel Study Income Dynamics (PSID) data set from 
the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan. The PSID is a nationally 
representative longitudinal data set in which 5,000 families and their children were 
interviewed each year starting from 1968. Additionally, I obtained the permission from 
the Institute for Social Research (ISR) at the University of Michigan to use a confidential 
supplemental data set, the PSID Geocode Match Files. Geocode Match Files provide 
information about the census tract of PSID respondents’ residence and match this 
information with U.S. Census Bureau data when possible. This data set is unique with its 
detailed portrait of the PSID respondents’ neighborhood environment and labor market 
information. In addition to PSID and Geocode Match Files, Census and County Business 
Pattern data are used to add control variables to the analysis. 
The data set is constructed by selecting PSID respondents who are identified as 
heads of households and probable labor force participants, who are between the ages of 
16 and 65 during the period of 1970 and 1993. If older than 65, an individual is removed 
from the sample. The estimations are based on a sample consisting of a 23-year panel of 
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16,672 household heads. PSID identified males as household heads unless it contained no 
male in the home or unless the male was too ill to answer the questions. The main reason 
for using the head of household as the unit of analysis is that moves are usually 
undertaken by families. When a family moves, all of its members move. The second 
reason is to avoid the multiple counting of moves for all family members (Crowder, 
2006). If an individual leaves the family, then PSID treats that individual as a separate 
family, and the individual becomes the head of household.  
 
Dependent Variables 
A variety of dependent variables are used in the analysis. First, PSID respondents 
were asked whether they moved in the past year. The corresponding variable, 
MOVELSTt, is a self-reported binary variable that indicates whether a household moved 
within one year before the current interview and that consists of all moves regardless of 
whether the move is within a census tract or between census tracts. MOVELSTt is 
provided by PSID core data; however, it does not include any information regarding the 
distance of a move or a neighborhood change. In addition to MOVELSTt, it is possible to 
construct several other move variables using the PSID Geocode supplement. The PSID 
Geocode files have information on the current interviewee’s residential location at the 
census tract level; therefore, it is possible to look whether the household moves within a 
census tract or between census tracts. A second dependent variable, CHt separates the 
moves that change census tracts from the moves within a census tract CHt is a binary 
variable, which takes the value 1 if household moves to another tract. Although the time 
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notation of the dependent variables (MOVELSTt, CHt) is given as t, it should be noted 
that the time encloses the moves from the previous year (t-1) to the current year (t) 
The key argument in the analysis is that a household would not leave its current 
location if a move will cut social ties with the neighborhood. If that is the case, with a 
move to an adjacent census tract, a household may still keep the social ties despite 
changing a tract. A physical move might not mean a change in social surroundings if new 
location is not far from the original neighborhood. In order to control the distance 
between moves, I used Topologically Integrated Geographic Encoding and Referencing 
(TIGER) system of Census. I add latitudes and longitudes of center of the tracts to the 
data, and calculate the distances between centers of tracts. Using the distance 
information, I created four more move variables, MOVE5t, MOVE10t, MOVE20t, and 
MOVE40t, are taking values 1 if the moves are farther than, 5, 10, 20 and 40 miles, 
respectively. 
In this study, the neighborhood is defined as a census tract that consists of a few 
blocks. Although tracts do not resemble exact neighborhoods, it is the closest measure to 
a neighborhood in a nationwide analysis. Studies dealing with the nationwide samples 
argue that tracts have neighborhood characteristics such as “easily recognizable physical 
boundaries, a compact shape, and a homogeneous population in terms of socio-economic 
characteristics, i.e., similar income and living conditions” (DeRango, 2001; Quillian, 
2003). According to U.S. Census Bureau, census tract populations generally range from 
1,500 to 8,000. Population may change depending on the type of census tracts such as 
business districts or residential districts. 
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Independent variables 
Understanding how a household’s social capital shapes its likelihood of moving is 
not an easy task since it requires a measure for a relatively unquantifiable concept such as 
social capital. The following section will discuss three different approaches to measuring 
social capital and then introduce one measure from each approach to measure social 
capital. 
The main variable of interest in the analysis is the variable used as an indicator for 
social capital, which is conceptualized as an attachment to a neighborhood. Prior 
literature typically uses three approaches to identify neighborhood attachment. The first 
approach identifies the attachment as a function of residents’ economic and social 
investments in the community. For example, it is possible to argue that the 
homeownership increases the probability of staying in the current neighborhood and 
therefore increases the duration of residence, or spell in the neighborhood, which causes a 
higher social capital value (DiPasquale, 1999; Glaeser et al., 2002). A second argument 
could be racial similarity; that is, the fact that blacks prefer living with other blacks can 
be interpreted as their desire to acquire higher social capital (Charles & Kline, 2006; 
Ihlanfeldt & Scafidi, 2002). Home ownership, family structure, and a racially 
homogeneous neighborhood are some examples of measures used in the first approach.20 
The variables commonly used within the first approach do not have a temporal 
component. The second approach to social capital includes the effect of time on 
neighborhood attachment. A good example is the spell, which measures the time spent in 
                                                 
20 Family structure has been used a measure for family social capital by Sun (1999) and Bianchi 
and Robinson (1997) before. The main argument is that family structure such as the number of 
siblings or the absence of one parent might affect the relationship between the family and 
neighborhood directly (i.e., the need of a child care in case having a single parent in the family) 
or indirectly (i.e., shaping the relationship between the child and parents). 
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the neighborhood.  It is reasonable to assume that the duration in the neighborhood 
increases an individual’s social capital (DiPasquale, 1999). 
 The third approach concentrates on social relationships and networks rather than 
investments and time spells. The vast majority of the studies measure social capital with 
individual’s interaction with the neighborhood. An individual’s participation in a 
community activity, the number of neighbors that an individual knows in the 
neighborhood, and an individual’s trust in his neighbors are some of the variables that 
were used in previous studies (Alesina & Ferrara, 2002; Paxton, 1999; Pettit & 
McLanahan, 2003; Pribesh & Downey, 1999).  Memberships in neighborhood 
institutions or church attendance are other good examples of measures used in this 
approach. 
This dissertation uses all three measures to identify neighborhood attachment. The 
first variable used in the analysis is racial similarity between neighborhood and the heads 
of household, SAMEt-2, which takes the value 1 if household’s race is the same as the 
majority race of the tract for the time period t-2.21 The model uses the social capital 
measure at t-2 since the move is occurring between the years t-1 and t. Therefore, the 
social capital measure at t-1 or t might not be reflecting the pre-move social capital 
measure. The use of lagged value also helps to avoid the potential reverse causality 
problem such that the move increases the individual’s social capital. It might be arguable 
that if the racial distribution in the neighborhood is homogeneous, then the racial 
similarity with the majority in the neighborhood might not be a good representative of   
social capital. Therefore, an additional variable was generated that measured racial 
similarity, SAMENESS t-2, which takes the value of 1 if the race of a household race is 
                                                 
21 (Charles & Kline, 2006; Ihlanfeldt & Scafidi, 2002) 
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the same as 50% or more of the neighborhood residents. The use of an additional social 
capital measure creates a test for robustness of the racial similarity measure.  
The second variable used for a neighborhood attachment measure is the time 
spent in the neighborhood for each household, DURATIONt-1. The majority of the 
studies propose a positive relationship between duration in the neighborhood and the 
attachment to the neighborhood. The use of PSID Geocode files allows the computation 
of the time that a household spent in the neighborhood after 1970. Basically, it is possible 
to show the effect of staying an additional year on an individual’s probability of moving.  
Unlike the first approach, in which racial similarity is less likely to change over time, this 
approach shows that the time a household spends in the neighborhood increases over 
time.  
The third variable, CONNECTEDNESS, is an index that the Survey Research 
Center of the University of Michigan constructed by using twelve questions from the 
PSID data. The aim of the connectedness index was to measure the individual’s 
attachment to his residential neighborhood where the individual is living. Table 2 shows 
the variables used for the construction of connectedness index.  Two of twelve questions, 
whether the individual attended a PTA meeting within a year and whether the individual 
knows more than 6 neighbors, are weighted more than other questions. The values of 
connectedness index lie between 0 and 9. While the lowest value (zero) represents a weak 
relationship between an individual and the neighborhood, the highest value (nine or 
more) represents a strong relationship. Three arbitrarily assigned dummy variables are 
created by using connectedness variables: LESSCONNECTED (the values between 0 and 
2), MIDCONNECTED (the values between 3 and 7) and HIGHCONNECTED (the values 
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between 8 and above). PSID did not ask the same questions, so it did not construct the 
connectedness index for the years after 1972.  
 
Table 1. The variables used in the construction of Connectedness 
 
 
o Connectedness to potential sources of help 
o Attended a PTA meeting within year* 
o Neutralize those with no children in school  
o Attends church once a month or more 
o Watches television more than 1 hr./day 
o Reads a newspaper once a week or more 
o Knows 2-5 neighbors by name 
o Knows 6 or more neighbors by name * 
o Has relatives within walking distance of DU  
o Goes to organizations once a month or more 
o Goes to a bar or a tavern once a month or more  
o Belongs to a labor union and pays dues 
* The bold ones are weighted more than others 
 
Also controlled was whether or not the move is taking place from an urban area. 
PSID core data provides the Beale-Ross rural-urban continuum code for the identification 
of urban areas for the years after 1985.  The Beale-Ross rural-urban continuum code 
ranges from 1 to 10, in which 1 represents a completely urban area and 10 represents a 
completely rural area.  In this study, an urban identification scale was constructed using 
the Beale-Ross rural-urban continuum code, in which 1 to 7 are characterized as urban 
areas. Table 1 shows the exact definitions of the code and the distribution of household 
moves by different code values. 
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Table 2. Rural-Urban Continuum Code 
 
Value  Definition Proportion
(Std. Dev.)
1 Central counties of metropolitan areas of  
1 million population or more 
0.366 
(0..481) 
2 Fringe counties of metropolitan areas of  
1 million population or more 
0.133 
(0.339) 
3 Counties in metropolitan areas of  
250 thousand to 1 million population 
0.228 
(0.419) 
4 Counties in metropolitan areas of  
less than 250 thousand population 
0.056 
(0.230) 
5 Urban population of 20,000 or more,  
adjacent to metropolitan area 
0.019 
(0.138) 
6 Urban population of 20,000 or more,  
not adjacent to a metropolitan area 
0.028 
(0.166) 
7 Urban population of less than 20,000,  
adjacent to a metropolitan area 
0.059 
(0.245) 
8 Urban population of less than 20,000,  
not adjacent to a metropolitan area 
0.079 
(0.269) 
9 Completely rural, adjacent to a metropolitan area 0.009 
(0.094) 
10 Completely rural, not adjacent to a metropolitan area 0.014 
(0.119) 
 
All models also include controls for household characteristics and neighborhood 
characteristics in explaining the probability of moving. The household characteristics are 
the  dummies for the age of the household head (AGE1626, AGE2636, AGE3646, 
AGE4656, and AGE5666), sex of household head (SEX), the number of children 
(NUMCHILD), the head of household’s marital status (MARITAL), total years of 
education (LESSTHANHIGHSCHOOL, HIGHSCHOOL, and COLLEGEUP), whether 
the head of household is non-white (NONWHITE ), previous years’ total family income 
divided by 10,000 (FAMINC), and whether the household owns the home 
(HOMEOWNER). Since one of the social capital measures is racial similarity, this 
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research did not include neighborhood characteristics that represent the racial distribution 
of the neighborhood in the regression set.  In order to control for neighborhood 
characteristics, this study used the lag value of the percent of high school graduates in the 
tract (LHIGHSCHOOL), the lag value of percent of occupied houses in the neighborhood 
(LOCCHOUSE), and the lag value of whether the tract is a high poverty area 
(POVERTY) as neighborhood characteristics.22  In order to see how an individual stands 
economically in the neighborhood, the difference between the family income and median 
income of the neighborhood (INCDIFF) is constructed. A detailed summary of dependent 
and independent variables are provided in Table 3. 
 
                                                 
22 The previous definition is used to identify high poverty tracts. If more than 40% of families in 
the tract are under poverty, then Census defines the tract as a high poverty area. 
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Table 3.  Variable Description 
Variables ALL SAMPLE INNER-CITY NON-WHITE 
LESS THAN HIGH 
SCHOOL GRAD. 
 Mean (Std.) N 
Mean 
(Std.) N 
Mean 
(Std.) N 
MOVELST if household moved last year (Self-reported) 0.266 
(0.442) 
141,206 
 
0.281 
(0.450) 
22,952 0.251 
(0.433) 
41,799 
CH if household moved to another tract 0.121 
(0.325) 
 
141,206 
0.154 
(0.361) 
22,977 0.102 
(0.302) 
41,825 
MOVE5 If  household moved to tract further than 5 
miles 
0.054 
(0.225) 
 
141,206 
0.062 
(0.241) 
22,977 0.041 
(0.199) 
41,825 
MOVE10 If household moved to tract further than 10 
miles 
0.040 
(0.196) 
 
141,206 
0.039 
(0.195) 
22,977 0.028 
(0.165) 
41,825 
MOVE20 If household moved to tract further than 20 
miles 
0.031 
(0.174) 
 
141,206 
0.024 
(0.154) 
22,977 0.019 
(0.136) 
41,825 
MOVE40 if household moved to tract further than 40 
miles 
0.026 
(0.159) 
 
141,206 
0.018 
(0.132) 
22,977 0.012 
(0.108) 
41,825 
SAME Whether the majority of tract is same with the 
race of the household 
0.657 
(0.475) 
 
141,206 
0.524 
(0.499) 
22,977 0.567 
(0.496) 
41,825 
SAMENESS Whether the majority of tract is same with the 
race of the household 
0.637 
(0.481) 
141,206 0.501 
(0.500) 
22,977 0.548 
(0.498) 
41,825 
SPELL Number of years spend in the neighborhood 
starting from 1970 
4.97 
(4.74) 
141,206 5.424 
(5.444) 
22,977 3.999 
(4.021) 
41,825 
AGE Age of household head 38.478 
(12.53) 
141,206 
 
37.667 
(11.59) 
22.977 42.227 
(13.70) 
41,825 
SEX Sex of household head    1= male     0= female 0.735 
(0.441) 
141,206 0.606 
(0.489) 
22.977 0.723 
(0.448) 
41,825 
HOMEOWNER Whether or not household is homeowner 1=yes   
0 = no  
0.500 
(0.499) 
141,206 
 
0.333 
(0.471) 
22,977 0.492 
(0.500) 
41,825 
YEARSEDUC Years of education 12.082 
(2.863) 
111,356    
 
 
NON-WHITE =1 if head of household is not white 0.410 
(0.491) 
140,697 
 
   
 
 
MARITAL  Marital Status of household head    1= Married   
0= otherwise 
0.601 
(0.490) 
141,206 
 
   
 
 
 
NUMCHILD Number of children  1.215 
(1.422) 
 
141,206 
   
 
 
 
FAMINC Total family income divided to 10000 2.408 
(2.709) 
141,206 
 
2.330 
(2.039) 
22977 1.328 
(1.229) 
41,537 
 
POVERTY Whether more than 40% of families are under 
poverty in the tract 
0.283 
(0.451) 
141,206 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
HIGHSCHOOL % of high school graduates in the tract 17.791 
(5.795) 
 
110,645 
  
 
 
 
 
 
OCCPHOUS % of owner occupied houses in the tract 56.4 
(23.23) 
110,631     
INCDIFF The difference between family income and the 
median income in the neighborhood 
-0.74 
(2.61) 
110,645     
MIL The miles that household commutes 5.34 
(10.12) 
141,206     
PROBWORK Probability of working in the same county that 
households live 
0.57  
(2.67) 
33,439     
CONNECTEDNESS How connected to neighborhood 5.91 (1.67) 
12,668     
 
  
58
Empirical Model 
  To investigate the effect of social capital on a household’s move decision, I 
follow three different specifications:  probit model of the probability of moving, fixed-
effect estimation, and event history analysis.  This section discusses these three 
specifications in detail.  
First, I estimate a probit model of the probability of moving, denoted ProbMOVE, 
as a function of a set of demographic characteristics of household (C), a set of 
neighborhood characteristics (N), and a variable representing social capital (SC).  The 
equation is specified as 
  +  ′+  ′+  ′+= −− ittitiit uSCNC )2(3)1(210it        (MOVE) Prob αααα                        (4)        
where i represents the ith individual and t is the tth year, t-1 is the (t-1)th year, and e is the 
error term.  In this specification, I use two of social capital measures, i.e., racial similarity 
(SAMENESS or SAME) and time spent in the neighborhood (NGHSPELL), respectively. 
Marginal effects of the probit estimation are calculated by using average marginal effects 
rather than marginal effects at mean. Simply, the average marginal effects approach 
computes the marginal changes for each observation and takes the average for 
population, while marginal effects at the mean approach takes the mean value of 
explanatory variables as a representative respondent and calculates the marginal effect for 
that individual.23 
Even though PSID Geocode Match Files provide residential location information, 
the job location is not available in PSID data. As prior literature suggests job location is a 
prominent factor in residential location decision. The final specification uses a proxy 
                                                 
23 For a detailed discussion of average marginal effects vs. marginal effects at the mean, see 
Verlinda (2006) and Bartus (2005). 
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variable, the probability of working in the same county for an individual, to control job 
location. The proxy variable is obtained by using County Business Pattern data and 
Census information. First, by using the 1980 Census data, the number of people who 
work in various industries for every county is extracted. Then, by using the County 
Business Pattern data, total number of establishments of each industry is extracted from 
1977 to1983 for each county. 24 These two numbers construct a rate that shows the 
number of establishment per worker in a county. It is doable to impute this rate for each 
individual using the industry code provided by the PSID data. The underlying assumption 
is that the probability of working in a county that an individual lives depends on the 
number of jobs available in the county and potential vacancy rate in these jobs. 
Therefore, the rate is a representation for the probability of working in a county where the 
individual lives in.  Then the specification is: 
uJLSCNCMOVE ittitiitit &&++′+′+′+= −− )2(3)1(210 αααα         (5) 
where itJL  is the proxy for job location. 
Using the lag value of the social capital measures allow me to ignore reverse 
causality problem. However, it is possible to argue that this specification is still prone to 
unobserved heterogeneity problem. It is simply possible to explicate this problem as 
having an unobserved variable which might affect both the social capital measure and 
household’s moving decision. One common way of eliminating that problem is the use of 
the instrumental variable approach. IV approach suggests using an instrument for the 
variable of interest (i.e., social capital in this study) such that the instrument needs to 
have a correlation with social capital measure while not having a correlation with 
                                                 
24 Only 7 years (3 years before and 3 years after 1980) are extracted to provide compatibility with 
Census that provides the information for 1980. 
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household’s move decision. There are two noticeable shortcomings of using IV approach 
in my analysis. First, the social capital measures (i.e., racial similarity and neighborhood 
spell) are already a proxy for social capital. Therefore, using an instrument for a proxy 
reduces the strength of the link between the instrument and social capital. Second and 
relatively more important shortcoming is the choice of the instrument. Since the IV 
approach requires no correlation between instrument and dependent variable, i.e., 
probability of moving, I have to eliminate all individual level variables since they might 
affect the individual’s probability of moving. The neighborhood level variables should be 
eliminated too, since it is possible to argue that the probability of moving is a function of 
the neighborhood characteristics.  
Another solution of unobserved heterogeneity is the use of fixed effect (FE) 
estimation procedure. The fixed effect estimation is similar to first-difference estimation. 
It is simply an OLS regression using the demeaned variables. In the fixed effect 
estimation, the model is: 
[6]  itiitkkitit uaxxy ++++= ββ L11   
For each observation i, average this equation over time: iiii uaxy +++= 10 ββ .  
The difference equation is ( ) iitiitiit uuxxyy −+−=− 1β , and then the transformed 
equation is uxxxy itkkititit &&&&L&&&&&& ++++= βββ 2211 . It can be easily seen that the individual 
effect ( ia ) is removed from equation. An estimator based upon this transformation of the 
data is known as the fixed effects estimator. The fixed effect estimator is efficient under 
the following assumptions: 
i) For each t;  ( ) 0, =Ε iiit au X  
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ii) For each t;  ( ) ( ) 2var,var uitiiit uau σ==X  
iii) For each t ≠ s;     ( ) 0,,cov =iiisit auu X  
The third clause posits that the explanatory variables that are constant over time. 
i.e., gender, or the explanatory variables that the difference is constant over time. i.e., 
age, cannot be included in regression equation since they cause multicollinearity. 
Therefore, in fixed effect analysis, I will only include time-variant individual 
characteristics and time-variant neighborhood characteristics.  Then the estimation 
equation is: 
 [7]   uSCNCMOVE tiititit &&+′+′+′+= − )2(3210 αααα  
where itC  and itN are time-variant individual and neighborhood characteristics. 
 Although time-invariant variables cannot be included by themselves in the fixed 
effects model, it is possible to interact time-invariant variables with variables that change 
over time such as time period dummy variables.  Then, the coefficient of the interaction 
will show how the partial effect of that variable changes over time. 
 In third specification, I use connectedness variable. As noted above, this variable 
is available only for three years; 1970, 1971, and 1972. Due to the limitation of data it is 
not possible to use all years in the regression estimation. However, it is possible to 
impute the value of connectedness of the last observation, which is 1972 in this case, for 
the subsequent moves until the household moves to another tract. This imputation 
assumes that the value of connectedness only changes with a move from the 
neighborhood. Using the available three years, it is possible to test the assumption by 
using ANOVA. First, those who moved from a neighborhood in these three years were 
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dropped, and then tested whether the value of connectedness change between years. The 
results support the assumption that there are not statistically significant differences 
between the values of connectedness over the years if individuals don’t move.  
Table 4. ANOVA results for connectedness vs. not moving  
 1970 1971 1971 
Mean of 
Connectedness 
6.12 6.10 6.12 
Analysis of Variance                                      
Between groups      .615269285      2    .307634643  0.12   0.8895
 Within groups       23747.3568         9041    2.62662944    
    Total             23747.972        9043    2.62611656    
 
Bartlett's test for equal variances:  chi2(2) =   0.3865  Prob>chi2 = 0.824       
 
Next, I use of the Event History Analysis (EHA). This approach simply uses the 
analysis of time period before the occurrences of specific event. The basic premise of 
EHA is that there is a risk of observing an event at any moment before the event. When 
the event occurs then the risk associated with event disappears, these observation then be 
reduced from the sample. Alm, McKee and Skidmore (1993) uses event history analysis 
method, which is also called discrete-time hazard function, to identify the effect of fiscal 
stress on existence of state lotteries.  In order to use event history analysis, the data is set 
by using the following rules: First, all head of households of 1970 have been chosen. In 
1971, those who moved from one location to another were dropped from the sample. In 
1972, those who moved from their neighborhood were dropped and so on. Then the 
dependent variable: 
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[8]   ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧=
ttimeatmovediindividualif
ttimeatmovetdidniindividualif
yit 1
'0
 
After constructing the sample, I used the probit model of probability of moving to 
estimate the effect of connectedness on probability of moving.  
I also try a slightly different version of EHA by constructing a cross-section 
version of panel data. In this method, the data is set as one observation for each 
individual. The MOVE variable in this case takes the value of 1 if an individual has 
moved from one location to another at least one time in a given time period. That time 
periods have been chosen arbitrarily as 5 years, 10 years, 15 years, and 20 years. Then the 
estimation equation: 
[9]   uiSCiNiCiyearsinonceMoved +′+′+′+= 3210)5(Pr αααα  
The main weakness of using the event history analysis is that the event history 
models ignore the duration dependence.  In other words, it is answering two questions: a) 
whether the event is occurring among more respondents and b) is this happening more 
quickly among respondents with the event.25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 For a detailed discussion of event history analysis see Allison (1984)  
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CHAPTER 5: EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This chapter presents the empirical results of the model developed in the previous 
chapter. The discussion of the empirical results in this chapter is divided into four 
sections:  The first analyzes the effects of various social capital measures on the 
probability of moving for all years; the second repeats the same analysis for a sub-sample 
from 1977 to 1983, by adding a proxy variable for the job location; the third presents the 
fixed effect estimation results; and the last presents and interprets the event history 
analysis. 
 
Social Capital - Probability of Moving 
 [4]         +  ′+  ′+  ′+= −− ittitiit uSCNC )2(3)1(210it        (MOVE) Prob αααα  
Recall equation [4] in Chapter 4, which presents the framework of the analysis in 
the first section.  The probability of moving is estimated as a function of individual 
characteristics (i.e., the age, gender, education, the marital status, and the race of the head 
of the household, family income, homeownership, the number of children in the 
household), the pre-move values of the neighborhood characteristics (i.e., the percentages 
of  high school graduates in the tract, families in the poverty income level, and housing 
occupied by owners, the definition of the tract as urban or not), and the pre-move value of 
the social capital measure. The first section uses three social capital measures: 
SAMENESS (whether more than 50 % of the neighborhood households are comprised of 
the same race), SAME (whether a household is comprised of individuals of the same race 
as the majority race in the neighborhood) and SPELL (the time spent in the neighborhood 
after 1970).  It should be noted that the SPELL variable does not measure the total time 
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spent in the neighborhood. Since collection of the PSID data set began in 1968, the time a 
household spent before 1968 cannot be ascertained. Therefore, the SPELL variable is 
constructed as the number of years that the households lived in the same neighborhood 
after 1970. The lack of prior information is a limitation for the SPELLt-1 variable. 
 Tables 5a through 7c present the probit regression results of social capital 
measures (SAME, SAMENESS, and SPELL, respectively) on the probability of a move 
(MOVELST, CH, MOVE5, MOVE10, MOVE20, MOVE40).  The tables present the 
estimated parameter from the probit regression as well as the average marginal effects. 
The marginal effect tables do not include the neighborhood characteristics since these 
characteristics, constructed using the census information, don’t change annually. 
Therefore, the average marginal effects are very close to zero and insignificant. Tables 5 
and 5a report the results for the SAMENESSt-2 measure. The coefficient of social capital 
measure, SAMENESSt-2, is negative and significant in all the regressions. Thus, it 
supports the argument that social capital reduces the probability of moving. The marginal 
effect is 4.5 in the self-reported MOVELST regression; that is, living in a neighborhood 
in which the race of more than half of the residents is similar to that of the household 
reduces the probability of that household’s moving by 4.5 percentage points on average, 
or by 16.9 % over the mean MOVELST rate. If the moves are split into distances, then 
the marginal effect of the social capital measure diminishes; however, it is still significant 
and of expected sign.  The diminishing marginal effects are the result of two factors. 
First, MOVELST is a self-reported move variable that might carry self-reporting bias. 
Second, move variables with distances (i.e., MOVE5, MOVE10, MOVE20 and 
MOVE40) are constructed using the Geocode information. Recall that in the construction 
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of these variables, the centers of the census tracts are used. If a household moves within 
the tracts, it is counted as a “not move” although the self reporting move variable shows a 
“move.” This specification underestimates the likelihood that the move is the reason for 
the reducing marginal effects. For moves of more than 5 miles, being a member of the 
dominant race in the neighborhood reduces the probability of a household’s moving by 
1.2 percentage points on average (or by more than 20 % over the mean value of 
MOVE5), and the effect diminishes to 0.03 percentage points for the moves farther than 
40 miles, or by 1.2 % over the mean value of MOVE40. 
 The coefficients of individual characteristics are mostly significant and of 
expected signs. The results suggest that being a younger head of household significantly 
increases the probability of moving, and male heads of household are more inclined to 
move than their female counterparts. The coefficients of homeownership are statistically 
significant and negative, as expected. Similarly, having an additional child in the family 
reduces the probability of moving. Non-white household heads and married household 
heads are less likely to move than white household heads and non-married household 
heads, respectively. While higher family income increases the probability of moving, 
being a high school graduate reduces the probability of moving.  The coefficient of 
commuting distance is insignificant, but of expected sign in the self reported move 
category. If moves split into distances, then the coefficient becomes significant; however, 
the marginal effects unexpectedly decline with further moves.  
 The coefficients of the neighborhood characteristics provide mixed results. Living 
in a neighborhood with a high poverty rate reduces the probability of moving 
significantly. This finding might be the result of residential segregation, as the spatial 
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mismatch hypothesis argues, or it might support this study’s argument, as the higher 
neighborhood attachment in low-income neighborhoods prevents residents from 
moving.26 The coefficient of INCDIFF, which is the difference between family income 
and median income in the neighborhood, is negative and significant for all set of 
regressions. The negative sign of INCDIFF is unexpected, suggesting that relative to their 
neighbors, the wealthier families are less likely to move from their neighborhood.  This 
negative effect is inconsistent with the above mentioned argument that states that low-
income households have a higher level of neighborhood attachment and are less likely to 
move. Although the sign of INCDIFF is unexpected and inconsistent with the underlying 
argument of this study, the signs of POVERTYt-1 and INCDIFF are not inconsistent since 
one of them directly shows neighborhood characteristics and the other shows the place of 
the household in that neighborhood.  The coefficient of the percentage of high school 
graduates in the neighborhood is negative and significant, as expected.  However, other 
neighborhood controls such as the percentage of owner-occupied housing and the 
urbanity of the previous neighborhood provide mixed results.  
  Tables 6-6a report the same analysis for SAMEt-2 and the results suggest effects 
similar to those of SAMENESSt-2.  One unit increase in the SAMEt-2 increases the 
MOVELST by 5 percentage points, or by 18.8 % over the mean value of MOVELST.  
Similarly, the effect on MOVE5 is 1.3 percentage points, or 24 % over the mean value of 
MOVE5.   In contrast, the effect of the SPELLt-1variable, which is reported in Tables 7-
7a, is lower than the prior two variables.  It reduces MOVELST by 1.9 percentage points 
                                                 
26 Recall that the marginal effects for neighborhood characteristics are not reported 
because the average marginal effect is used in the analysis and for each individual, the 
value of neighborhood characteristics doesn’t change over time. 
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(by 8.4 % over the mean value of MOVELST) and MOVE5 by 0.3 percentage points (by 
5.6 % over the mean value of MOVE5).  All other demographic and neighborhood 
characteristics are similar to those of previous measure, SAMENESSt-2. 
 To test whether the results are in line with prior spatial mismatch studies, two 
separate sub-samples were constructed. The first one included only households with high 
school diplomas or less (low-educated sample) and the second one included inner-city 
minorities.  In the first sample, one unit increase in the SAMENESSt-2 measure increases 
the probability of moving (MOVELST) by 3.9 percentage points (by 15 % over the 
mean), which is consistent with the primary findings.  In the second sample, the marginal 
effect of SAMENESSt-2 is 2 (7 % of the mean value of MOVELST), relatively smaller 
than that of previous results; however, it is still negative and significant. 
In order to prevent the potential attrition problem, a “no-attrition” sub-sample is 
constructed. This sub-sample, which contains those that were in the sample in 1970 and 
remained until 1993, is comprised of 1,066 household heads. The size and the 
significance of the coefficient of the SAMENESSt-2 variable do not change in the 
MOVELST estimation; however, the significance disappears as the distance of the move 
increases. One possible reason of the loss of significance is that the number of moves to 
further distances is significantly less than that of the MOVELST variable due to the 
above mentioned reasons:  possible self-reporting and Geocoding biases. For example, 
moving farther than 40 miles constitutes only 1 % of all observations but 14 % for the 
self-reporting MOVELST variable. 
 The results are consistent with the hypotheses of this dissertation. All three social 
capital measures produce negative and statistically significant coefficients for six 
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different sets of equations. The individual characteristics are of expected sign and 
significance. Among the neighborhood characteristics, only the poverty level of the 
neighborhood provides a significant coefficient. 
 
Social Capital vs. Probability of Moving with a Proxy for Job Location 
As noted before, the PSID data do not have any information on job location. To 
control the potential effect of job location on residential location decision, a proxy 
(PROBWORK) is created by using Census 1980 information and County Business 
Pattern data. Tables 8 through 10 present the results for the equation re-estimated by 
adding the proxy results for the years between 1977 and 1983. 
 The proxy variable is not significant in most of the regressions (except the 
MOVELST estimations of SAMENESSt-2 and SAMEt-2); however, adding a proxy 
variable for job location increased the marginal effect of the social capital measure. Table 
8a presents the average marginal effects.  The average marginal effect of the self-reported 
MOVELST variable increases from 4.5 to 8.3. All individual level variables are of 
expected sign, significance, and size similar to those of the previous results. The 
neighborhood controls have similar signs and sizes; however, they are mostly 
insignificant (except the percent of the owner-occupied housing in MOVELST 
estimations).  
 
Fixed Effect Estimation 
Individual fixed effect (FE) models control for individual-specific time-invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity. This type of unobserved heterogeneity, which is usually a 
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result of unobserved individual characteristics such as self-esteem, motivation, and 
discipline, provides biased estimates.  Therefore, the FE model will control the 
individual-level, unobserved characteristics such as motivation, which might affect both 
social capital measures and the moving decision of individuals. 
Tables 11, 12, and 13 provide the results for fixed effect estimations for 
SAMENESS, SAME, and SPELL, respectively. Only one of the three social capital 
measures provides estimates consistent with those of previous results. The coefficient of 
SAMENESS is negative and significant for the MOVELST and CH specifications, 
becomes insignificant for the MOVE5, MOVE10, and MOVE20 specifications, and then 
positive and significant for the MOVE40 specification. The coefficients of SAME 
produce estimates with the same signs as those of SAMENESSt-2, but the size of the 
coefficients are relatively smaller. While the coefficient of SPELL is negative for 
MOVELST, it becomes positive and significant as the distance of the moves increases. 
However, the size decreases as distance decreases, which suggests that households that 
spent relatively more time in the neighborhood are less likely to move farther away.  
Since FE estimation does not include time-invariant variables, individual 
characteristics are added to the set of regressions by constricting some interaction terms. 
The interaction term (Social capital Measure * NON-WHITE) produces mixed results. If 
the race of the head of household is same as the majority race, but not more than 50 
percent in the neighborhood, then the non-white household heads are less likely to move 
from their neighborhoods. This result is consistent with the hypotheses of this dissertation 
as it would explain the lower rate of residential mobility among inner city minorities.  On 
the other hand, if the race of the head of household is dominant in the neighborhood, the 
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sign of the interaction term becomes positive. Although the specific cause of this 
separation cannot be ascertained, possible explanations may lie with factors such as high 
crime or concentrated poverty, generally associated with dominant minority 
neighborhoods.  Unlike the previous model, the coefficients of owner-occupied housing 
are negative, which is expected and significant.  
 
Event History Analysis 
Recall that the CONNECTEDNESS variable is available only for the years before 
1972. In order to incorporate the available CONNECTEDNESS information into the 
analysis, this research followed two different Event History Analysis approaches. First, 
the same probability of the moving equation of the previous sections is estimated by 
creating a new sample.  This sample drops heads of household from the sample when 
they first move from their original neighborhood. The second approach uses the probit 
estimation by creating a cross-section sample including the variable if the head of 
household has moved in different time periods. 
I expect negative and significant coefficients for MIDCONNECTED and 
HIGHCONNECTED variables. Tables 14 and 14a report the regression results of the first 
estimation. Both variables are significant with the expected sign for all columns. For the 
self-reported moving category (MOVELST), heads of household with strong connections 
to the neighborhood are less likely to move than those with weak connections. For 
example, having a strong connection to the neighborhood reduces the likelihood of 
moving by 10 percentage points than having a weak connection to the neighborhood. 
Thus, the results support the argument that high social capital in the form of strong 
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neighborhood attachment reduces the probability of an individual’s moving. Among the 
other individual level characteristics, the coefficients of education and non-white 
variables are different than what we expected, suggesting that non-white heads of 
household are more likely to move than white ones. 
In the second version of the EHA, a cross-section version of panel data is 
constructed. The dependent variable is 1 if an individual has moved from one location to 
another at least one time in a given time period. The time periods have been arbitrarily 
chosen as 5 years, 10 years, 15 years, and 20 years. Table 14 reports the marginal effects 
of the regression results, which are consistent with those of the first approach of the EHA 
and those of the previous sections. The coefficients of social capital measures 
MIDCONNECTED and HIGHCONNECTED are of expected sign and significance. Thus, 
having a strong connection to the neighborhood in 1972 reduces the probability of 
moving in the next 5, 10, 15, and 20 years, respectively. On average, households with 
strong connections to the neighborhood are 25 % less likely to move to another 
neighborhood in the next five years. For the next 20 years, the likelihood of not moving 
declines to 20 % for the same type of head of household, but this is still significant. 
 
 
  
73
Table 5. Probit Regressions: SAMENESS 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 MOVELST CH MOVE5 MOVE10 MOVE20 MOVE40 
Age 16-25 1.253*** 
(0.032) 
1.180*** 
(0.037) 
0.944*** 
(0.052) 
0.925*** 
(0.072) 
0.753*** 
(0.090) 
0.600*** 
(0.128) 
Age 26-35 0.876*** 
(0.028) 
0.878*** 
(0.034) 
0.693*** 
(0.048) 
0.697*** 
(0.067) 
0.530*** 
(0.084) 
0.439*** 
(0.117) 
Age 36-45 0.526*** 
(0.029) 
0.559*** 
(0.036) 
0.429*** 
(0.051) 
0.469*** 
(0.069) 
0.297*** 
(0.088) 
0.219* 
(0.124) 
Age 46-55 0.197*** 
(0.029) 
0.250*** 
(0.036) 
0.146*** 
(0.053) 
0.194*** 
(0.073) 
0.021 
(0.094) 
-0.110 
(0.141) 
Sex   0.349*** 
(0.024) 
0.298*** 
(0.026) 
0.277*** 
(0.034) 
0.316*** 
(0.044) 
0.277*** 
(0.060) 
0.317*** 
(0.085) 
Homeowner -0.656*** 
(0.018) 
-0.670*** 
(0.021) 
-0.488*** 
(0.028) 
-0.467*** 
(0.037) 
-0.513*** 
(0.051) 
-0.601*** 
(0.074) 
High School -0.082*** 
(0.020) 
-0.242*** 
(0.023) 
-0.144*** 
(0.033) 
-0.065 
(0.044) 
-0.152*** 
(0.059) 
-0.027 
(0.089) 
College and up -0.035 
(0.024) 
-0.215*** 
(0.027) 
-0.114*** 
(0.036) 
-0.036 
(0.048) 
-0.016 
(0.063) 
0.161* 
(0.094) 
Non-white -0.121*** 
(0.020) 
-0.039* 
(0.022) 
-0.197*** 
(0.029) 
-0.297*** 
(0.038) 
-0.404*** 
(0.053) 
-0.458*** 
(0.076) 
Marital Status -0.473*** 
(0.022) 
-0.401*** 
(0.024) 
-0.381*** 
(0.031) 
-0.340*** 
(0.040) 
-0.276*** 
(0.054) 
-0.182** 
(0.077) 
Number of Children -0.035*** 
(0.006) 
-0.022*** 
(0.007) 
-0.017* 
(0.009) 
-0.020 
(0.013) 
-0.034* 
(0.018) 
-0.034 
(0.026) 
Family Income 0.006 
(0.005) 
0.033*** 
(0.006) 
0.036*** 
(0.007) 
0.040*** 
(0.009) 
0.017 
(0.013) 
-0.005 
(0.019) 
SAMENESSt-2 -0.196*** 
(0.018) 
-0.089*** 
(0.020) 
-0.188*** 
(0.027) 
-0.224*** 
(0.035) 
-0.242*** 
(0.047) 
-0.116* 
(0.069) 
Mile 0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
INCDIFF -0.019*** 
(0.004) 
-0.031*** 
(0.005) 
-0.034*** 
(0.006) 
-0.043*** 
(0.007) 
-0.025** 
(0.010) 
-0.021 
(0.014) 
Povertyt-1 -0.070*** 
(0.023) 
-0.103*** 
(0.026) 
-0.164*** 
(0.038) 
-0.229*** 
(0.054) 
-0.230*** 
(0.076) 
-0.221** 
(0.112) 
%  High schoolt-1 -0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.005*** 
(0.002) 
-0.008*** 
(0.002) 
-0.013*** 
(0.003) 
-0.015*** 
(0.004) 
% Owner-occupied 
houset-1 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Urbant-1 0.099* 
(0.056) 
0.246*** 
(0.068) 
0.040 
(0.080) 
-0.072 
(0.096) 
-0.124 
(0.124) 
-0.217 
(0.155) 
Constant -1.064*** 
(0.079) 
-1.675*** 
(0.093) 
-2.059*** 
(0.120) 
-2.296*** 
(0.152) 
-2.265*** 
(0.201) 
-2.711*** 
(0.280) 
N 72058 72097 72097 72097 72097 72097 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 5a. Marginal Effects: SAMENESS 
 
 MOVELST CH MOVE5 MOVE10 MOVE20 MOVE40 
Age 16-25 0.371*** 
(0.011) 
0.272*** 
(0.012) 
0.102*** 
(0.009) 
0.052*** 
(0.008) 
0.014*** 
(0.003) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
Age 26-35 0.208*** 
(0.008) 
0.148*** 
(0.008) 
0.048*** 
(0.005) 
0.024*** 
(0.004) 
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
0.001** 
(0.001) 
Age 36-45 0.124*** 
(0.008) 
0.097*** 
(0.008) 
0.032*** 
(0.005) 
0.017*** 
(0.004) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Age 46-55 0.045*** 
(0.007) 
0.041*** 
(0.007) 
0.009** 
(0.004) 
0.006** 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Sex   0.073*** 
(0.006) 
0.042*** 
(0.004) 
0.015*** 
(0.002) 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.001** 
(0.000) 
Homeowner -0.149*** 
(0.003) 
-0.097*** 
(0.002) 
-0.026*** 
(0.001) 
-0.011*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
High School -0.018*** 
(0.004) 
-0.036*** 
(0.003) 
-0.008*** 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
College and up -0.008 
(0.005) 
-0.031*** 
(0.003) 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Non-white -0.027*** 
(0.004) 
-0.006* 
(0.003) 
-0.011*** 
(0.001) 
-0.008*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Marital Status -0.109*** 
(0.004) 
-0.062*** 
(0.003) 
-0.023*** 
(0.001) 
-0.009*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.000** 
(0.000) 
Number of Children -0.008*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.001* 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Family Income 0.001 
(0.001) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
SAMENESSt-2 -0.045*** 
(0.004) 
-0.014*** 
(0.003) 
-0.012*** 
(0.001) 
-0.007*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
Mile 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Povertyt-1 -0.015*** 
(0.005) 
-0.015*** 
(0.004) 
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.000** 
(0.000) 
Urbant-1 0.022* 
(0.013) 
0.038*** 
(0.012) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001* 
(0.000) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 6. Probit Regressions: SAME 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 MOVELST CH MOVE5 MOVE10 MOVE20 MOVE40 
Age 16-25 1.250*** 
(0.032) 
1.178*** 
(0.037) 
0.941*** 
(0.052) 
0.924*** 
(0.072) 
0.752*** 
(0.091) 
0.599*** 
(0.128) 
Age 26-35 0.875*** 
(0.028) 
0.877*** 
(0.034) 
0.692*** 
(0.048) 
0.697*** 
(0.067) 
0.530*** 
(0.084) 
0.438*** 
(0.117) 
Age 36-45 0.525*** 
(0.029) 
0.558*** 
(0.036) 
0.429*** 
(0.051) 
0.470*** 
(0.069) 
0.299*** 
(0.088) 
0.218* 
(0.124) 
Age 46-55 0.197*** 
(0.029) 
0.251*** 
(0.036) 
0.146*** 
(0.053) 
0.195*** 
(0.073) 
0.023 
(0.095) 
-0.110 
(0.141) 
Sex   0.348*** 
(0.024) 
0.298*** 
(0.026) 
0.277*** 
(0.034) 
0.316*** 
(0.044) 
0.277*** 
(0.060) 
0.317*** 
(0.085) 
Homeowner -0.658*** 
(0.018) 
-0.670*** 
(0.021) 
-0.489*** 
(0.028) 
-0.470*** 
(0.037) 
-0.518*** 
(0.051) 
-0.603*** 
(0.074) 
High School -0.083*** 
(0.020) 
-0.243*** 
(0.023) 
-0.145*** 
(0.033) 
-0.069 
(0.044) 
-0.157*** 
(0.059) 
-0.029 
(0.089) 
College and up -0.037 
(0.024) 
-0.216*** 
(0.027) 
-0.117*** 
(0.036) 
-0.041 
(0.048) 
-0.022 
(0.063) 
0.157* 
(0.094) 
Non-white -0.130*** 
(0.020) 
-0.043* 
(0.022) 
-0.207*** 
(0.029) 
-0.300*** 
(0.039) 
-0.403*** 
(0.054) 
-0.458*** 
(0.077) 
Marital Status -0.473*** 
(0.022) 
-0.401*** 
(0.024) 
-0.381*** 
(0.031) 
-0.338*** 
(0.040) 
-0.273*** 
(0.054) 
-0.180** 
(0.077) 
Number of Children -0.034*** 
(0.006) 
-0.021*** 
(0.007) 
-0.016* 
(0.009) 
-0.019 
(0.013) 
-0.034* 
(0.018) 
-0.033 
(0.026) 
Family Income 0.005 
(0.005) 
0.032*** 
(0.006) 
0.035*** 
(0.007) 
0.039*** 
(0.009) 
0.016 
(0.013) 
-0.006 
(0.019) 
SAMEt-2 -0.213*** 
(0.019) 
-0.098*** 
(0.021) 
-0.204*** 
(0.028) 
-0.218*** 
(0.036) 
-0.224*** 
(0.050) 
-0.107 
(0.072) 
Mile 0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
INCDIFF -0.019*** 
(0.004) 
-0.030*** 
(0.005) 
-0.034*** 
(0.006) 
-0.042*** 
(0.007) 
-0.025** 
(0.010) 
-0.021 
(0.014) 
Povertyt-1 -0.068*** 
(0.023) 
-0.101*** 
(0.026) 
-0.161*** 
(0.038) 
-0.232*** 
(0.054) 
-0.236*** 
(0.076) 
-0.224** 
(0.112) 
%  High schoolt-1 -0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
-0.005*** 
(0.002) 
-0.008*** 
(0.002) 
-0.013*** 
(0.003) 
-0.016*** 
(0.004) 
% Owner-occupied 
houset-1 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Urbant-1 0.105* 
(0.056) 
0.249*** 
(0.068) 
0.046 
(0.080) 
-0.069 
(0.096) 
-0.122 
(0.124) 
-0.216 
(0.156) 
Constant -1.032*** 
(0.079) 
-1.660*** 
(0.094) 
-2.028*** 
(0.120) 
-2.274*** 
(0.153) 
-2.249*** 
(0.203) 
-2.704*** 
(0.282) 
N 72058 72097 72097 72097 72097 72097 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 6a. Marginal Effects: SAME 
 
 MOVELST CH MOVE5 MOVE10 MOVE20 MOVE40 
Age 16-25 0.369*** 
(0.011) 
0.272*** 
(0.012) 
0.101*** 
(0.009) 
0.052*** 
(0.008) 
0.014*** 
(0.003) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
Age 26-35 0.208*** 
(0.008) 
0.148*** 
(0.008) 
0.048*** 
(0.005) 
0.024*** 
(0.004) 
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
0.001** 
(0.001) 
Age 36-45 0.124*** 
(0.008) 
0.097*** 
(0.008) 
0.032*** 
(0.005) 
0.017*** 
(0.004) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Age 46-55 0.046*** 
(0.007) 
0.041*** 
(0.007) 
0.009** 
(0.004) 
0.006** 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Sex   0.073*** 
(0.006) 
0.042*** 
(0.004) 
0.015*** 
(0.002) 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.001** 
(0.000) 
Homeowner -0.150*** 
(0.003) 
-0.097*** 
(0.002) 
-0.027*** 
(0.001) 
-0.011*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
High School -0.018*** 
(0.004) 
-0.036*** 
(0.003) 
-0.008*** 
(0.002) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
College and up -0.008 
(0.0050 
-0.031*** 
(0.003) 
-0.007*** 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Non-white -0.029*** 
(0.004) 
-0.007** 
(0.003) 
-0.012*** 
(0.001) 
-0.008*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Marital Status -0.109*** 
(0.004) 
-0.062*** 
(0.003) 
-0.023*** 
(0.001) 
-0.009*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.000** 
(0.000) 
Number of Children -0.008*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.001* 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Family Income 0.001 
(0.001) 
0.005*** 
(0.0010 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
SAMEt-2 -0.050*** 
(0.004) 
-0.015*** 
(0.003) 
-0.013*** 
(0.002) 
-0.007*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Mile 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Povertyt-1 -0.015*** 
(0.005) 
-0.015*** 
(0.004) 
-0.008*** 
(0.002) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.000** 
(0.000) 
Urban 0.023* 
(0.013) 
0.038*** 
(0.012) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001* 
(0.000) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 7. Probit Regressions: SPELLt-1 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 MOVELST CH MOVE5 MOVE10 MOVE20 MOVE40 
Age 16-25 0.918*** 
(0.028) 
0.981*** 
(0.034) 
0.753*** 
(0.049) 
0.775*** 
(0.068) 
0.636*** 
(0.085) 
0.595*** 
(0.116) 
Age 26-35 0.588*** 
(0.026) 
0.690*** 
(0.032) 
0.547*** 
(0.046) 
0.580*** 
(0.064) 
0.429*** 
(0.081) 
0.376*** 
(0.111) 
Age 36-45 0.338*** 
(0.027) 
0.433*** 
(0.033) 
0.353*** 
(0.048) 
0.405*** 
(0.066) 
0.259*** 
(0.084) 
0.205* 
(0.116) 
Age 46-55 0.124*** 
(0.027) 
0.193*** 
(0.033) 
0.126** 
(0.051) 
0.195*** 
(0.070) 
0.042 
(0.089) 
-0.011 
(0.127) 
Sex   0.348*** 
(0.020) 
0.291*** 
(0.022) 
0.256*** 
(0.029) 
0.288*** 
(0.038) 
0.270*** 
(0.051) 
0.270*** 
(0.068) 
Homeowner -0.578*** 
(0.016) 
-0.597*** 
(0.018) 
-0.443*** 
(0.025) 
-0.436*** 
(0.033) 
-0.493*** 
(0.046) 
-0.555*** 
(0.064) 
High School 0.033* 
(0.017) 
-0.117*** 
(0.020) 
-0.048* 
(0.028) 
-0.008 
(0.037) 
-0.091* 
(0.050) 
-0.058 
(0.068) 
College and up 0.055*** 
(0.020) 
-0.103*** 
(0.023) 
-0.032 
(0.031) 
0.020 
(0.041) 
0.015 
(0.054) 
0.106 
(0.073) 
Non-white -0.037** 
(0.016) 
0.006 
(0.018) 
-0.115*** 
(0.024) 
-0.197*** 
(0.031) 
-0.271*** 
(0.043) 
-0.342*** 
(0.058) 
Marital Status -0.452*** 
(0.019) 
-0.390*** 
(0.020) 
-0.343*** 
(0.027) 
-0.322*** 
(0.035) 
-0.261*** 
(0.047) 
-0.152** 
(0.062) 
Number of Children -0.035*** 
(0.005) 
-0.024*** 
(0.006) 
-0.022*** 
(0.008) 
-0.019* 
(0.011) 
-0.038** 
(0.015) 
-0.032 
(0.021) 
Family Income 0.010** 
(0.005) 
0.033*** 
(0.005) 
0.043*** 
(0.006) 
0.048*** 
(0.008) 
0.028*** 
(0.011) 
0.004 
(0.016) 
SPELLt-1 -0.081*** 
(0.002) 
-0.045*** 
(0.003) 
-0.048*** 
(0.004) 
-0.045*** 
(0.005) 
-0.045*** 
(0.007) 
-0.044*** 
(0.009) 
Mile 0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
INCDIFF -0.014*** 
(0.004) 
-0.026*** 
(0.004) 
-0.036*** 
(0.005) 
-0.043*** 
(0.006) 
-0.028*** 
(0.009) 
-0.020* 
(0.012) 
Povertyt-1 -0.080*** 
(0.020) 
-0.114*** 
(0.022) 
-0.189*** 
(0.033) 
-0.252*** 
(0.046) 
-0.267*** 
(0.064) 
-0.210** 
(0.086) 
%  High schoolt-1 -0.002** 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.003** 
(0.002) 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.012*** 
(0.003) 
-0.013*** 
(0.004) 
% Owner-occupied 
houset-1 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
Urbant-1 0.016 
(0.050) 
0.181*** 
(0.060) 
-0.051 
(0.072) 
-0.153* 
(0.086) 
-0.224** 
(0.111) 
-0.356*** 
(0.128) 
Constant -0.747*** 
(0.069) 
-1.482*** 
(0.082) 
-1.927*** 
(0.107) 
-2.228*** 
(0.137) 
-2.204*** 
(0.180) 
-2.352*** 
(0.232) 
N 83592 83641 83641 83641 83641 83641 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 7a. Marginal Effects: SPELLt-1 
 
 MOVELST CH MOVE5 MOVE10 MOVE20 MOVE40 
Age 16-25 0.261*** 
(0.009) 
0.222*** 
(0.010) 
0.076*** 
(0.008) 
0.042*** 
(0.006) 
0.011*** 
(0.003) 
0.004*** 
(0.002) 
Age 26-35 0.140*** 
(0.007) 
0.122*** 
(0.007) 
0.041*** 
(0.005) 
0.022*** 
(0.004) 
0.005*** 
(0.002) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
Age 36-45 0.081*** 
(0.007) 
0.079*** 
(0.007) 
0.028*** 
(0.005) 
0.017*** 
(0.004) 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Age 46-55 0.029*** 
(0.007) 
0.034*** 
(0.006) 
0.009** 
(0.004) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
Sex   0.076*** 
(0.005) 
0.045*** 
(0.004) 
0.016*** 
(0.002) 
0.008*** 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Homeowner -0.136*** 
(0.003) 
-0.094*** 
(0.002) 
-0.027*** 
(0.001) 
-0.012*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
High School 0.008* 
(0.004) 
-0.019*** 
(0.003) 
-0.003* 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.001** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
College and up 0.013*** 
(0.005) 
-0.017*** 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Non-white -0.009** 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.007*** 
(0.001) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Marital Status -0.108*** 
(0.004) 
-0.066*** 
(0.003) 
-0.023*** 
(0.001) 
-0.010*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Number of Children -0.008*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.001*** 
(0.001) 
-0.001* 
(0.000) 
0.000** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Family Income 0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.000** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
SPELLt-1 -0.019*** 
(0.001) 
-0.007*** 
(0.000) 
-0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
Mile 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Povertyt-1 -0.018*** 
(0.004) 
-0.018*** 
(0.003) 
-0.011*** 
(0.002) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Urban 0.004 
(0.012) 
0.030*** 
(0.011) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 8. Probit Regressions with a Proxy for Job Location- SAMENESS 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 MOVELST CH MOVE5  MOVE10 MOVE20 
Age 16-25 1.242*** 
(0.095) 
1.144*** 
(0.134) 
0.915*** 
(0.194) 
1.543*** 
(0.450) 
1.207** 
(0.525) 
Age 26-35 0.902*** 
(0.087) 
0.814*** 
(0.127) 
0.636*** 
(0.186) 
1.328*** 
(0.443) 
1.062** 
(0.513) 
Age 36-45 0.390*** 
(0.093) 
0.445*** 
(0.136) 
0.341* 
(0.201) 
1.016** 
(0.453) 
0.768 
(0.535) 
Age 46-55 0.065 
(0.094) 
0.021 
(0.143) 
0.005 
(0.212) 
0.675 
(0.461) 
0.531 
(0.538) 
Sex   0.257*** 
(0.061) 
0.333*** 
(0.077) 
0.362*** 
(0.107) 
0.326** 
(0.141) 
0.335 
(0.215) 
Homeowner -0.810*** 
(0.049) 
-0.901*** 
(0.069) 
-0.701*** 
(0.102) 
-0.688*** 
(0.142) 
-0.601*** 
(0.215) 
High School -0.035 
(0.084) 
0.115 
(0.117) 
0.180 
(0.185) 
0.157 
(0.265) 
-0.034 
(0.350) 
College and up -0.035 
(0.090) 
-0.017 
(0.127) 
0.022 
(0.197) 
0.031 
(0.277) 
-0.118 
(0.374) 
Non-white -0.261*** 
(0.055) 
-0.044 
(0.071) 
-0.159 
(0.100) 
-0.149 
(0.131) 
-0.126 
(0.202) 
Marital Status -0.484*** 
(0.059) 
-0.511*** 
(0.075) 
-0.516*** 
(0.104) 
-0.408*** 
(0.135) 
-0.337 
(0.208) 
Number of Children -0.026 
(0.018) 
-0.015 
(0.024) 
-0.067* 
(0.038) 
-0.067 
(0.050) 
-0.125 
(0.082) 
Family Income 0.000 
(0.016) 
0.005 
(0.023) 
0.015 
(0.034) 
-0.003 
(0.048) 
-0.051 
(0.078) 
SAMENESSt-2 -0.381*** 
(0.054) 
-0.217*** 
(0.067) 
-0.250*** 
(0.095) 
-0.152 
(0.126) 
0.132 
(0.205) 
Probability of Work 1.109* 
(0.660) 
0.287 
(0.885) 
1.828 
(1.228) 
0.167 
(1.643) 
0.210 
(2.462) 
Mile -0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.012*** 
(0.004) 
0.015*** 
(0.006) 
INCDIFF -0.002 
(0.010) 
0.003 
(0.013) 
-0.016 
(0.017) 
-0.025 
(0.022) 
-0.026 
(0.034) 
Povertyt-1 0.090 
(0.065) 
-0.112 
(0.080) 
-0.336*** 
(0.126) 
-0.423** 
(0.171) 
-0.390 
(0.250) 
%  High schoolt-1 -0.008*** 
(0.003) 
-0.011*** 
(0.004) 
-0.019*** 
(0.006) 
-0.019*** 
(0.007) 
-0.023** 
(0.011) 
% Owner-occupied 
houset-1 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
Constant -0.725*** 
(0.156) 
-1.385*** 
(0.214) 
-1.984*** 
(0.320) 
-3.008*** 
(0.579) 
-3.392*** 
(0.797) 
N 9949 9954 9954 9954 9954 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 8a. Marginal Effects for Job Location- SAMENESS 
 
 MOVELST CH MOVE5  MOVE10 MOVE20 
Age 16-25 0.335*** 
(0.031) 
0.181*** 
(0.032) 
0.048** 
(0.019) 
0.066 
(0.048) 
0.007 
(0.010) 
Age 26-35 0.184*** 
(0.023) 
0.085*** 
(0.019) 
0.022** 
(0.010) 
0.030 
(0.023) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
Age 36-45 0.084*** 
(0.022) 
0.054*** 
(0.020) 
0.013 
(0.010) 
0.032 
(0.028) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
Age 46-55 0.013 
(0.020) 
0.002 
(0.015) 
0.000 
(0.006) 
0.016 
(0.019) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
Sex   0.049*** 
(0.013) 
0.031*** 
(0.009) 
0.010** 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
Homeowner -0.173*** 
(0.007) 
-0.082*** 
(0.005) 
-0.017*** 
(0.003) 
-0.006** 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
High School -0.007 
(0.017) 
0.011 
(0.012) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
College and up -0.007 
(0.018) 
-0.002 
(0.013) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
0.000 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Non-white -0.051*** 
(0.010) 
-0.004 
(0.007) 
-0.005* 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Marital Status -0.103*** 
(0.010) 
-0.054*** 
(0.006) 
-0.016*** 
(0.003) 
-0.005*** 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Number of Children -0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Family Income 0.000 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
SAMENESSt-2 -0.083*** 
(0.010) 
-0.024*** 
(0.006) 
-0.008*** 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Mile 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000** 
(0.000) 
0.000** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Povertyt-1 0.018 
(0.014) 
-0.011 
(0.007) 
-0.008*** 
(0.002) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 9. Probit Regressions with a Proxy for Job Location- SAME 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 MOVELST CH MOVE5  MOVE10 MOVE20 
Age 16-25 1.235*** 
(0.095) 
1.140*** 
(0.134) 
0.909*** 
(0.195) 
1.537*** 
(0.449) 
1.205** 
(0.524) 
Age 26-35 0.897*** 
(0.087) 
0.811*** 
(0.127) 
0.632*** 
(0.186) 
1.323*** 
(0.443) 
1.060** 
(0.512) 
Age 36-45 0.388*** 
(0.093) 
0.444*** 
(0.136) 
0.338* 
(0.201) 
1.013** 
(0.452) 
0.766 
(0.534) 
Age 46-55 0.059 
(0.094) 
0.018 
(0.143) 
0.001 
(0.212) 
0.671 
(0.460) 
0.530 
(0.537) 
Sex   0.256*** 
(0.061) 
0.332*** 
(0.077) 
0.361*** 
(0.107) 
0.325** 
(0.141) 
0.335 
(0.215) 
Homeowner -0.810*** 
(0.049) 
-0.901*** 
(0.069) 
-0.701*** 
(0.102) 
-0.685*** 
(0.141) 
-0.599*** 
(0.214) 
High School -0.031 
(0.084) 
0.117 
(0.117) 
0.182 
(0.185) 
0.158 
(0.264) 
-0.032 
(0.350) 
College and up -0.031 
(0.090) 
-0.015 
(0.127) 
0.023 
(0.197) 
0.032 
(0.277) 
-0.117 
(0.374) 
Non-white -0.268*** 
(0.055) 
-0.051 
(0.071) 
-0.170* 
(0.101) 
-0.162 
(0.131) 
-0.137 
(0.202) 
Marital Status -0.484*** 
(0.059) 
-0.512*** 
(0.075) 
-0.518*** 
(0.104) 
-0.409*** 
(0.135) 
-0.337 
(0.207) 
Number of Children -0.026 
(0.018) 
-0.014 
(0.024) 
-0.066* 
(0.038) 
-0.066 
(0.050) 
-0.125 
(0.082) 
Family Income -0.000 
(0.016) 
0.005 
(0.023) 
0.014 
(0.034) 
-0.003 
(0.048) 
-0.051 
(0.078) 
SAMEt-2 -0.401*** 
(0.055) 
-0.234*** 
(0.068) 
-0.276*** 
(0.096) 
-0.180 
(0.127) 
0.105 
(0.206) 
Probability of Work 1.108* 
(0.660) 
0.290 
(0.885) 
1.843 
(1.228) 
0.175 
(1.640) 
0.215 
(2.457) 
Mile -0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.012*** 
(0.004) 
0.015*** 
(0.006) 
INCDIFF -0.001 
(0.010) 
0.004 
(0.013) 
-0.016 
(0.017) 
-0.025 
(0.022) 
-0.026 
(0.034) 
Povertyt-1 0.099 
(0.065) 
-0.106 
(0.080) 
-0.327*** 
(0.126) 
-0.413** 
(0.171) 
-0.383 
(0.250) 
%  Highschoolt-1 -0.008*** 
(0.003) 
-0.012*** 
(0.004) 
-0.019*** 
(0.006) 
-0.019*** 
(0.007) 
-0.023** 
(0.011) 
% Owner-occupied 
houset-1 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
Constant -0.694*** 
(0.157) 
-1.360*** 
(0.214) 
-1.952*** 
(0.321) 
-2.972*** 
(0.578) 
-3.369*** 
(0.796) 
N 9949 9954 9954 9954 9954 
Standard errors in parentheses  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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TABLE 9a. Marginal Effects for Job Location- SAME 
 
 MOVELST CH MOVE5  MOVE10 MOVE20 
Age 16-25 0.332*** 
(0.031) 
0.180*** 
(0.032) 
0.048** 
(0.019) 
0.066 
(0.048) 
0.007 
(0.010) 
Age 26-35 0.182*** 
(0.023) 
0.085*** 
(0.019) 
0.021** 
(0.010) 
0.030 
(0.023) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
Age 36-45 0.083*** 
(0.022) 
0.053*** 
(0.020) 
0.013 
(0.010) 
0.032 
(0.028) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
Age 46-55 0.012 
(0.019) 
0.002 
(0.015) 
0.000 
(0.006) 
0.016 
(0.019) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
Sex   0.049*** 
(0.013) 
0.031*** 
(0.009) 
0.010** 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
Homeowner -0.172*** 
(0.007) 
-0.082*** 
(0.005) 
-0.017*** 
(0.003) 
-0.006** 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
High School -0.006 
(0.017) 
0.012 
(0.012) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
College and up -0.006 
(0.018) 
-0.002 
(0.013) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
0.000 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Non-white -0.053*** 
(0.010) 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
-0.005* 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Marital Status -0.103*** 
(0.010) 
-0.054*** 
(0.006) 
-0.016*** 
(0.003) 
-0.005*** 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Number of Children -0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Family Income 0.000 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
SAMEt-2 -0.088*** 
(0.010) 
-0.026*** 
(0.006) 
-0.009*** 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Mile 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000** 
(0.000) 
0.000** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Povertyt-1 0.020 
(0.014) 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
-0.008*** 
(0.002) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** significant at 10% ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
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Table 10. Probit Regressions with a Proxy for Job Location- SPELLt-1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 MOVELST CH MOVE5  MOVE10 MOVE20 
Age 16-25 0.522*** 
(0.073) 
0.706*** 
(0.098) 
0.568*** 
(0.148) 
0.826*** 
(0.249) 
0.574** 
(0.274) 
Age 26-35 0.322*** 
(0.069) 
0.472*** 
(0.095) 
0.390*** 
(0.143) 
0.687*** 
(0.246) 
0.491* 
(0.267) 
Age 36-45 0.117 
(0.074) 
0.279*** 
(0.100) 
0.186 
(0.154) 
0.534** 
(0.256) 
0.250 
(0.287) 
Age 46-55 0.057 
(0.075) 
0.090 
(0.104) 
0.042 
(0.161) 
0.391 
(0.262) 
0.155 
(0.293) 
Sex   0.309*** 
(0.044) 
0.327*** 
(0.052) 
0.341*** 
(0.073) 
0.301*** 
(0.095) 
0.260** 
(0.125) 
Homeowner -0.565*** 
(0.037) 
-0.661*** 
(0.048) 
-0.428*** 
(0.069) 
-0.385*** 
(0.092) 
-0.381*** 
(0.127) 
High School -0.031 
(0.059) 
-0.032 
(0.075) 
0.000 
(0.115) 
0.008 
(0.157) 
0.035 
(0.207) 
College and up -0.047 
(0.064) 
-0.142* 
(0.081) 
-0.105 
(0.123) 
-0.055 
(0.167) 
0.003 
(0.220) 
Non-white -0.152*** 
(0.035) 
-0.036 
(0.043) 
-0.112* 
(0.062) 
-0.209** 
(0.083) 
-0.276** 
(0.113) 
Marital Status -0.425*** 
(0.043) 
-0.417*** 
(0.050) 
-0.454*** 
(0.070) 
-0.385*** 
(0.092) 
-0.292** 
(0.123) 
Number of Children 0.000 
(0.013) 
0.020 
(0.016) 
-0.002 
(0.024) 
-0.013 
(0.033) 
-0.054 
(0.047) 
Family Income -0.007 
(0.013) 
0.004 
(0.016) 
0.013 
(0.024) 
-0.021 
(0.034) 
-0.068 
(0.050) 
SPELLt-1 -0.193*** 
(0.007) 
-0.119*** 
(0.008) 
-0.107*** 
(0.013) 
-0.102*** 
(0.017) 
-0.060*** 
(0.022) 
Probability of Work -0.067 
(0.277) 
-0.205 
(0.497) 
-0.137 
(0.621) 
-0.679 
(1.161) 
-0.428 
(1.533) 
Mile -0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.004** 
(0.002) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.007*** 
(0.003) 
0.007* 
(0.004) 
INCDIFF 0.011 
(0.007) 
0.010 
(0.009) 
-0.006 
(0.012) 
-0.005 
(0.016) 
-0.007 
(0.022) 
Povertyt-1 0.062 
(0.045) 
-0.076 
(0.054) 
-0.210** 
(0.082) 
-0.200* 
(0.110) 
-0.163 
(0.149) 
%  High schoolt-1 -0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.005** 
(0.003) 
-0.011*** 
(0.004) 
-0.013** 
(0.005) 
-0.017*** 
(0.007) 
% Owner-occupied 
houset-1 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
Constant 0.049 
(0.110) 
-0.789*** 
(0.143) 
-1.489*** 
(0.215) 
-2.068*** 
(0.328) 
-2.179*** 
(0.411) 
N 14254 14260 14260 14260 14260 
Standard errors in parentheses 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 10a. Marginal Effects for Job Location - SPELLt-1 
 MOVELST CH MOVE5  MOVE10 MOVE20 
Age 16-25 0.128*** 
(0.020) 
0.121*** 
(0.022) 
0.038*** 
(0.014) 
0.031* 
(0.018) 
0.007 
(0.006) 
Age 26-35 0.071*** 
(0.016) 
0.067*** 
(0.016) 
0.021** 
(0.010) 
0.020* 
(0.012) 
0.005 
(0.005) 
Age 36-45 0.026 
(0.017) 
0.043** 
(0.017) 
0.011 
(0.010) 
0.020 
(0.014) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
Age 46-55 0.013** 
(0.017) 
0.013 
(0.016) 
0.002 
(0.009) 
0.013 
(0.012) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
Sex   0.065** 
(0.010) 
0.043*** 
(0.008) 
0.016*** 
(0.004) 
0.006** 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
Homeowner -0.128*** 
(0.007) 
-0.086*** 
(0.004) 
-0.020*** 
(0.003) 
-0.008*** 
(0.002) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
High School -0.007 
(0.013) 
-0.004 
(0.010) 
0.000 
(0.006) 
0.000 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
College and up -0.010 
(0.014) 
-0.019* 
(0.010) 
-0.005 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
Non-white -0.033*** 
(0.007) 
-0.005 
(0.006) 
-0.006** 
(0.003) 
-0.005*** 
(0.002) 
-0.002** 
(0.001) 
Marital Status -0.098*** 
(0.009) 
-0.060*** 
(0.006) 
-0.024*** 
(0.003) 
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
-0.002** 
(0.001) 
Number of Children 0.000 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Family Income -0.001 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
SPELLt-1 -0.042*** 
(0.001) 
-0.017*** 
(0.001) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
Mile 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000** 
(0.000) 
0.000** 
(0.000) 
0.000** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Povertyt-1 0.014 
(0.010) 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
-0.010*** 
(0.003) 
-0.004** 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** significant at 10% ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
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Table 11. Fixed Effect Estimation - SAMENESS 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 MOVELST CH MOVE5 MOVE10 MOVE20 MOVE40 
Age 16-25 0.160*** 
(0.015) 
0.053*** 
(0.012) 
0.017** 
(0.008) 
0.015*** 
(0.006) 
0.011*** 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
Age 26-35 0.078*** 
(0.012) 
0.020** 
(0.010) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
0.006* 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
Age 36-45 0.038*** 
(0.010) 
0.013 
(0.008) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
Age 46-55 0.011* 
(0.007) 
0.005 
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Homeowner -0.111*** 
(0.006) 
-0.090*** 
(0.005) 
-0.034*** 
(0.003) 
-0.017*** 
(0.002) 
-0.007*** 
(0.002) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
High School -0.029*** 
(0.006) 
-0.059*** 
(0.005) 
-0.017*** 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
College and up -0.043*** 
(0.008) 
-0.073*** 
(0.007) 
-0.018*** 
(0.004) 
-0.008*** 
(0.003) 
-0.004* 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Number of Children -0.024*** 
(0.002) 
-0.015*** 
(0.001) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Family Income 0.002 
(0.001) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
SAMENESSt-2 -0.111*** 
(0.014) 
-0.024** 
(0.012) 
-0.009 
(0.007) 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.007*** 
(0.003) 
SAMENESSt-2 * 
Non-white 
0.086*** 
(0.012) 
0.017* 
(0.010) 
0.011* 
(0.006) 
0.008 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
SAMENESSt-2 * Sex 0.010 
(0.013) 
0.002 
(0.011) 
-0.007 
(0.007) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.005* 
(0.002) 
Mile 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000** 
(0.000) 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
INCDIFF -0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001* 
(0.000) 
-0.000* 
(0.000) 
Povertyt-1 -0.013* 
(0.007) 
-0.013** 
(0.006) 
-0.014*** 
(0.004) 
-0.007** 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
%  High schoolt-1 -0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.001* 
(0.000) 
-0.000** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
% Owner-occupied 
houset-1 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000* 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Urbant-1 0.012 
(0.023) 
0.010 
(0.019) 
0.002 
(0.012) 
-0.003 
(0.009) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
Constant 0.308*** 
(0.029) 
0.252*** 
(0.024) 
0.093*** 
(0.015) 
0.044*** 
(0.011) 
0.019** 
(0.008) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
N 72058 72097 72097 72097 72097 72097 
R-squared 0.392 0.346 0.279 0.282 0.294 0.295 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 12.  Fixed Effect Estimation - SAME 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  MOVELST CH MOVE5 MOVE10 MOVE20 MOVE40 
Age 16-25 0.159*** 
(0.015) 
0.053*** 
(0.012) 
0.017** 
(0.008) 
0.015*** 
(0.006) 
0.011*** 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
Age 26-35 0.077*** 
(0.012) 
0.020** 
(0.010) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
0.006* 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
Age 36-45 0.038*** 
(0.010) 
0.013 
(0.008) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
Age 46-55 0.011* 
(0.007) 
0.005 
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Homeowner -0.111*** 
(0.006) 
-0.090*** 
(0.005) 
-0.035*** 
(0.003) 
-0.017*** 
(0.002) 
-0.007*** 
(0.002) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
High School -0.029*** 
(0.006) 
-0.059*** 
(0.005) 
-0.017*** 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
College and up -0.043*** 
(0.008) 
-0.073*** 
(0.007) 
-0.018*** 
(0.004) 
-0.008*** 
(0.003) 
-0.004* 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Number of Children -0.024*** 
(0.002) 
-0.015*** 
(0.001) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Family Income 0.001 
(0.001) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
SAMEt-2 -0.034*** 
(0.011) 
-0.011 
(0.009) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
-0.000 
(0.004) 
-0.000 
(0.003) 
0.004* 
(0.002) 
SAMEt-2 * Non-white -0.088*** 
(0.012) 
-0.015 
(0.010) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
0.006* 
(0.003) 
0.006** 
(0.002) 
SAMEt-2 * Sex 0.020 
(0.013) 
0.007 
(0.011) 
-0.006 
(0.007) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.005* 
(0.002) 
Mile 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000** 
(0.000) 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
INCDIFF -0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001* 
(0.000) 
-0.000* 
(0.000) 
Povertyt-1 -0.013* 
(0.007) 
-0.013** 
(0.006) 
-0.014*** 
(0.004) 
-0.007** 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
%  High schoolt-1 -0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.001* 
(0.000) 
-0.000** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
% Owner-occupied 
houset-1 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000* 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Urbant-1 0.012 
(0.023) 
0.010 
(0.019) 
0.002 
(0.012) 
-0.003 
(0.009) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
Constant 0.313*** 
(0.029) 
0.252*** 
(0.024) 
0.094*** 
(0.015) 
0.043*** 
(0.011) 
0.018** 
(0.008) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
N 72058 72097 72097 72097 72097 72097 
R-squared 0.392 0.346 0.279 0.282 0.294 0.295 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 13.  Fixed Effect Estimation - SPELL t-1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 MOVELST CH MOVE5 MOVE10 MOVE20 MOVE40 
Age 16-25 0.124*** 
(0.015) 
0.091*** 
(0.012) 
0.021*** 
(0.008) 
0.018*** 
(0.006) 
0.012*** 
(0.004) 
0.005* 
(0.003) 
Age 26-35 0.035*** 
(0.012) 
0.051*** 
(0.010) 
0.010 
(0.007) 
0.008* 
(0.005) 
0.006* 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
Age 36-45 0.001 
(0.010) 
0.038*** 
(0.008) 
0.009 
(0.005) 
0.007* 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
Age 46-55 -0.010 
(0.007) 
0.019*** 
(0.006) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
Homeowner -0.108*** 
(0.005) 
-0.089*** 
(0.004) 
-0.033*** 
(0.003) 
-0.016*** 
(0.002) 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
High School -0.025*** 
(0.006) 
-0.070*** 
(0.005) 
-0.020*** 
(0.003) 
-0.007*** 
(0.002) 
-0.004*** 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
College and up -0.035*** 
(0.007) 
-0.076*** 
(0.006) 
-0.019*** 
(0.004) 
-0.010*** 
(0.003) 
-0.007*** 
(0.002) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
Number of Children -0.027*** 
(0.002) 
-0.014*** 
(0.001) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Family Income 0.001 
(0.001) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
SPELLt-1 -0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.005*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000** 
(0.000) 
Mile  0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
INCDIFF -0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001** 
(0.000) 
-0.000* 
(0.000) 
Povertyt-1 -0.013* 
(0.007) 
-0.020*** 
(0.006) 
-0.016*** 
(0.004) 
-0.009*** 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
%  High schoolt-1 -0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
% Owner-occupied houset-1 -0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Urbant-1 0.045** 
(0.022) 
0.014 
(0.019) 
0.000 
(0.012) 
-0.008 
(0.009) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
-0.000 
(0.004) 
Constant 0.288*** 
(0.028) 
0.176*** 
(0.023) 
0.074*** 
(0.015) 
0.036*** 
(0.011) 
0.018** 
(0.008) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
N 83793 83842 83842 83842 83842 83842 
R-squared 0.397 0.347 0.285 0.288 0.302 0.311 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 14. Probit Regression Results for Event History Analysis 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 MOVELST CH MOVE5  MOVE10 MOVE20 
Age 16-25 1.167*** 
(0.063) 
1.117*** 
(0.074) 
0.863*** 
(0.120) 
0.768*** 
(0.165) 
0.525*** 
(0.202) 
Age 26-35 0.830*** 
(0.050) 
0.785*** 
(0.062) 
0.738*** 
(0.103) 
0.751*** 
(0.142) 
0.510*** 
(0.170) 
Age 36-45 0.403*** 
(0.050) 
0.456*** 
(0.063) 
0.379*** 
(0.104) 
0.372** 
(0.144) 
0.184 
(0.176) 
Age 46-55 0.147*** 
(0.046) 
0.164*** 
(0.060) 
0.167* 
(0.100) 
0.179 
(0.138) 
0.078 
(0.166) 
Sex   0.437*** 
(0.053) 
0.442*** 
(0.062) 
0.412*** 
(0.099) 
0.481*** 
(0.136) 
0.416** 
(0.167) 
Homeowner -0.700*** 
(0.038) 
-0.677*** 
(0.047) 
-0.631*** 
(0.077) 
-0.761*** 
(0.114) 
-0.792*** 
(0.154) 
High School -0.087** 
(0.038) 
-0.091** 
(0.046) 
0.003 
(0.075) 
0.107 
(0.106) 
0.120 
(0.137) 
College and up 0.046 
(0.048) 
-0.004 
(0.057) 
0.119 
(0.088) 
0.220* 
(0.121) 
0.341** 
(0.160) 
Non-white 0.143*** 
(0.038) 
0.173*** 
(0.044) 
0.032 
(0.070) 
-0.120 
(0.096) 
-0.108 
(0.120) 
Marital Status -0.467*** 
(0.050) 
-0.374*** 
(0.058) 
-0.389*** 
(0.091) 
-0.454*** 
(0.122) 
-0.426*** 
(0.155) 
Number of Children -0.015 
(0.011) 
-0.006 
(0.013) 
-0.001 
(0.021) 
0.016 
(0.029) 
0.002 
(0.037) 
Family Income 0.032*** 
(0.011) 
0.052*** 
(0.013) 
0.077*** 
(0.018) 
0.098*** 
(0.024) 
0.040 
(0.034) 
Moderate connection -0.605*** 
(0.168) 
-0.557*** 
(0.185) 
-0.428 
(0.291) 
-0.629* 
(0.347) 
-0.811** 
(0.391) 
High connection -0.601*** 
(0.156) 
-0.736*** 
(0.171) 
-0.696** 
(0.270) 
-1.005*** 
(0.319) 
-1.189*** 
(0.353) 
Mile 0.003 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.009*** 
(0.003) 
0.014*** 
(0.004) 
0.013** 
(0.005) 
INCDIFF -0.039*** 
(0.009) 
-0.052*** 
(0.011) 
-0.069*** 
(0.016) 
-0.089*** 
(0.022) 
-0.059** 
(0.025) 
Povertyt-1 -0.060 
(0.048) 
-0.028 
(0.056) 
-0.102 
(0.097) 
-0.157 
(0.138) 
-0.281 
(0.181) 
%  High schoolt-1 0.005* 
(0.002) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.000 
(0.005) 
-0.008 
(0.006) 
-0.020** 
(0.008) 
% Owner-occupied 
houset-1 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.003** 
(0.002) 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
0.006** 
(0.003) 
Constant -1.068*** 
(0.183) 
-1.470*** 
(0.209) 
-2.542*** 
(0.365) 
-2.664*** 
(0.479) 
-2.286*** 
(0.571) 
N 22070 22092 22092 22092 22092 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 14a. Marginal Effects for Event History Analysis 
 
 MOVELST CH MOVE5  MOVE10 MOVE20 
Age 16-25 0.282*** 
(0.021) 
0.178*** 
(0.019) 
0.035*** 
(0.011) 
0.010 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
Age 26-35 0.162*** 
(0.013) 
0.091*** 
(0.011) 
0.021*** 
(0.006) 
0.007 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Age 36-45 0.067*** 
(0.010) 
0.046*** 
(0.008) 
0.009** 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
Age 46-55 0.023*** 
(0.008) 
0.015** 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Sex   0.061*** 
(0.009) 
0.035*** 
(0.006) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Homeowner -0.114*** 
(0.004) 
-0.059*** 
(0.003) 
-0.012*** 
(0.003) 
-0.005 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
High School -0.013** 
(0.005) 
-0.008** 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
College and up 0.007 
(0.007) 
0.000 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Non-white 0.022*** 
(0.006) 
0.015*** 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Marital Status -0.075*** 
(0.006) 
-0.034*** 
(0.004) 
-0.008*** 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Number of Children -0.002 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Family Income 0.005*** 
(0.002) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Moderate connection -0.067*** 
(0.012) 
-0.034*** 
(0.007) 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
High connection -0.117*** 
(0.023) 
-0.097*** 
(0.014) 
-0.025*** 
(0.007) 
-0.019 
(0.008) 
-0.012 
(0.009) 
Mile 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Povertyt-1 -0.009 
(0.007) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 15. Probit Estimation for Event History Analysis (Cross-Section) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Moved in 5 Years Moved in 10 Years Moved in 15 Years Moved in 20+ Years 
Moderate 
connection 
-0.487*** 
(0.108) 
-0.557*** 
(0.118) 
-0.487*** 
(0.119) 
-0.429*** 
(0.119) 
High connection -0.721*** 
(0.111) 
-0.799*** 
(0.120) 
-0.734*** 
(0.121) 
-0.680*** 
(0.121) 
Age 16-25 2.022*** 
(0.126) 
2.097*** 
(0.135) 
2.125*** 
(0.138) 
2.169*** 
(0.141) 
Age 26-35 1.292*** 
(0.090) 
1.485*** 
(0.094) 
1.578*** 
(0.096) 
1.614*** 
(0.097) 
Age 36-45 0.592*** 
(0.087) 
0.704*** 
(0.088) 
0.793*** 
(0.089) 
0.915*** 
(0.089) 
Age 46-55 0.359*** 
(0.084) 
0.586*** 
(0.085) 
0.656*** 
(0.085) 
0.669*** 
(0.085) 
Sex   0.173*** 
(0.065) 
0.138** 
(0.068) 
0.113 
(0.069) 
0.086 
(0.070) 
Homeowner -0.691*** 
(0.068) 
-0.736*** 
(0.071) 
-0.784*** 
(0.073) 
-0.766*** 
(0.074) 
Non-white 0.197*** 
(0.070) 
0.083 
(0.073) 
0.068 
(0.074) 
0.037 
(0.075) 
Number of 
Children 
-0.006 
(0.015) 
0.008 
(0.016) 
0.013 
(0.016) 
0.019 
(0.017) 
Family Income -0.113*** 
(0.042) 
-0.120*** 
(0.043) 
-0.109** 
(0.043) 
-0.091** 
(0.043) 
INCDIFF 0.006 
(0.015) 
0.015 
(0.015) 
0.016 
(0.015) 
0.012 
(0.015) 
Povertyt-1 -0.171** 
(0.081) 
-0.115 
(0.084) 
-0.127 
(0.086) 
-0.108 
(0.087) 
%  High schoolt-1 -0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.009** 
(0.004) 
-0.007* 
(0.004) 
-0.008* 
(0.004) 
% Owner-occupied 
houset-1 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
Constant 0.549*** 
(0.190) 
0.817*** 
(0.199) 
0.721*** 
(0.201) 
0.694*** 
(0.202) 
N 3057 3050 3048 3044 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 15a. Marginal Effects for Event History Analysis (Cross-Section) 
 
 Moved in 5 Years Moved in 10 Years Moved in 15 Years Moved in 20+ 
Years 
Moderate 
connection 
-0.128*** 
(0.030) 
-0.136*** 
(0.031) 
-0.116*** 
(0.030) 
-0.101*** 
(0.030) 
High connection -0.199*** 
(0.032) 
-0.207*** 
(0.034) 
-0.185*** 
(0.033) 
-0.168*** 
(0.033) 
Age 16-25 0.413*** 
(0.008) 
0.373*** 
(0.008) 
0.358*** 
(0.008) 
0.348*** 
(0.008) 
Age 26-35 0.328*** 
(0.015) 
0.332*** 
(0.012) 
0.333*** 
(0.010) 
0.327*** 
(0.010) 
Age 36-45 0.151*** 
(0.020) 
0.163*** 
(0.018) 
0.176*** 
(0.017) 
0.197*** 
(0.016) 
Age 46-55 0.093*** 
(0.021) 
0.136*** 
(0.018) 
0.145*** 
(0.016) 
0.143*** 
(0.016) 
Sex   0.047*** 
(0.018) 
0.035** 
(0.017) 
0.028* 
(0.017) 
0.021 
(0.017) 
Homeowner -0.202*** 
(0.021) 
-0.200*** 
(0.021) 
-0.205*** 
(0.022) 
-0.195*** 
(0.021) 
Non-white 0.054*** 
(0.019) 
0.021 
(0.018) 
0.017 
(0.018) 
0.009 
(0.018) 
Number of 
Children 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
Family Income -0.031*** 
(0.012) 
-0.031*** 
(0.011) 
-0.027** 
(0.011) 
-0.022** 
(0.010) 
Povertyt-1 -0.047** 
(0.022) 
-0.029 
(0.022) 
-0.031 
(0.022) 
-0.026 
(0.021) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
92
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
This dissertation investigates alternative explanations for the adjustment patterns 
of low-income, inner-city minorities to particular residential locations. Specifically, this 
study estimates the effect of social capital on the probability of households’ moving. By 
employing longitudinal data, this research has attempted to address how social capital 
plays a role in a household’s decision to move under the irreversibility assumption. This 
chapter will  present a brief overview of the dissertation,  summarize its primary findings, 
and then conclude with a discussion of its contributions. 
Following Kain’s (1968)seminal study, which pioneered the idea that low-skilled 
minorities in inner cities face higher unemployment rates and lower wages due to the 
decentralization of low-skill jobs combined with housing segregation, also referred to as 
the spatial mismatch hypothesis, researchers became increasingly interested in the 
rationale behind the spatial mismatch problem. The SMH mainly asserts that the location 
of low-skill jobs and the residences of low-skilled workers, which are located far from 
each other, cause negative labor market outcomes for low-skilled residents who reside 
closer to the Central Business District (CBD). In other words, the lower degree of 
suburbanization among low-skilled workers, combined with the decentralization of low-
skill jobs, has resulted in a spatial mismatch between job opportunities and the residential 
locations of low-skilled workers.    
Despite extensive interest in the concept, the literature to date has not reached a 
consensus on the mechanisms behind spatial mismatch. The leading explanation is that 
low-income individuals are not able to move to places with rich job opportunities since 
some external constraints such as residential segregation or job market segregation 
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prevents them from making such a move. The primary assumption of this explanation is 
that low-income households want to move away from their inner-city neighborhoods. 
Only a few studies call attention to the possible reluctance of inner-city residents to 
relocate.  
In addition to literature that has focused on the mechanisms of the spatial 
mismatch problem, a recently growing body of literature has investigated the effect of the 
neighborhood on individual’s labor market outcomes. In this literature, the neighborhood, 
as an informal network, helps individuals in their job search process.  This literature 
mainly argues that the link established between a household and a neighborhood, also 
referred to as social capital, might provide positive outcomes in a job search process. 
Social capital may even become more important in the absence of human capital such 
that having an informal network might compensate for the disadvantages of a poor 
education. Thus, a low-skilled household may prefer to keep its association with a 
neighborhood until the point at which the opportunity cost of losing that link is at its 
minimum.  
This study searches for an answer to the question, why do low-income, inner-city 
minorities choose not to move to residential locations that offer more job opportunities 
(i.e., the suburbs) even if they find a job in such location.  The mechanism behind this 
phenomenon can be explained by “irreversible investment theory.”  The notion of 
irreversibility refers to an investment that generates a high cost that can not be recovered. 
This literature argues that it could be advantageous to maintain the option to choose a 
better investment and thus delay the investment until the future becomes less uncertain. 
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The possibility of adding further information about the future might reduce the 
uncertainty and help individuals make the best decision. 
 When the notion of irreversibility is applied to the residential mobility 
framework, the motivation behind the decision of inner-city minorities to stay in their 
current inner-city neighborhood can be explained by the households’ willingness to keep 
the moving option available until the time that further information reduces uncertainty. 
Then, a relatively higher commuting time and commuting distance for inner-city 
minorities can be observed not only because of the potential barriers they face but also 
because of their reluctance to move from their inner city locations. The majority of the 
studies investigate the barrier effects (i.e., they focus on residential and labor market 
segregation rather than on the potential reluctance effect. If living in a neighborhood is a 
way of ensuring the existence of social capital, then less residential mobility among 
inner-city minorities is expected to occur. The underlying assumption of such behavior is 
that inner-city households might lose all of their once-established connections if they 
relocate. In other words, the established social capital cannot be recovered once they have 
relocated, so it is irreversible. 
None of the studies have yet combined the concepts of irreversibility and social 
capital. One complication in linking the two concepts is the fact that the irreversibility of 
social capital might depend on the measures chosen to determine social capital.  The 
literature presents three main approaches to measuring social capital:   The first approach 
uses variables without a temporal dimension. Homeownership, racial similarity in the 
neighborhood, and family size are examples of this approach. The second approach uses 
variables with a time dimension.  One example is the duration of residence, or spell, in 
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the neighborhood.  The third approach uses an individual’s interaction with the 
neighborhood.  Some of the variables used in previous studies include one’s participation 
in a community activity, the number of neighbors that an individual knows in the 
neighborhood, and an individual’s trust in his neighbors. This dissertation uses one 
measure from each approach:  racial similarity in the neighborhood, duration or spell in 
the neighborhood, and connectedness to the neighborhood.  
This dissertation uses the data set of the Panel Study Income Dynamics (PSID) 
from the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan. This longitudinal data 
set consists of 5,000 families and their children who were interviewed each year starting 
from 1968.  Permission to use the PSID Geocode Match Files, a confidential 
supplemental data set that matches a household’s tract information with U.S. Census 
information had to be obtained from the Institute for Social Research (ISR) at the 
University of Michigan.  The PSID is unique with its detailed portrait of the 
neighborhood environment of the respondents.  
 
Primary Findings 
Table 16 presents a summary of the findings across comparable models for a 
variety of social capital measures for three moving variables:  MOVELST ( a self-
reported moving variable from the PSID), MOVE5 (a moving variable, constructed using 
Geocode information, that represents moves farther than 5 miles), and MOVE20 (that 
represents moves farther than 20 miles) . The results based on these data consistently 
suggest that a high level of social capital significantly reduces the probability of moving. 
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The estimates from the main model are negative, significant, and robust to various 
specifications.  
Table 16. Summary of the Findings 
  SAMENESSt-2 SAMEt-2 SPELLt-1 MID-
CONNECT 
HIGH-
CONNECT 
            
Probit  MOVELST (-) *** (-) *** (-) *** N/A N/A N/A N/A 
MOVE5 (-) *** (-) *** (-) *** N/A N/A N/A N/A 
MOVE20 (-) *** (-) *** (-) *** N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Probit with 
Proxy for Job 
Location 
MOVELST (-) *** (-) *** (-) *** N/A N/A N/A N/A 
MOVE5 (-) *** (-) *** (-) *** N/A N/A N/A N/A 
MOVE20 (-)  (-)  (-) *** N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Fixed Effect 
Estimation 
MOVELST (-) *** (-) *** (-) *** N/A N/A N/A N/A 
MOVE5 (-)  (-)  (+) *** N/A N/A N/A N/A 
MOVE20 (+)  (+)  (+) *** N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Event History 
Analysis 1 
MOVELST N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A (-) *** (-) *** 
MOVE5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A (-)  (-) ** 
MOVE20 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A (-) ** (-) *** 
Event History 
Analysis 2 
5 Years N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A (-) *** (-) *** 
10 Years  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A (-) *** (-) *** 
15 Years N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A (-) *** (-) *** 
20+ Years N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A (-) *** (-) *** 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
(-) and (+) represent the sign of coefficients 
N/A Æ Not applicable 
 
In all models, the demographic characteristics are significant, of expected sign, 
and consistent with theory. Being a homeowner, an older head of household, female, and 
non-white significantly reduces the probability of moving. On the other hand, the 
neighborhood characteristics produce mixed results, none consistently significant across 
models and specifications. The use of various specifications (i.e., adding year dummies, 
additional controls) or the use of various samples (a “no attrition” sample,   a “low-
educated” sample, or an “inner-city non-white” sample) did not change the outcome of 
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the main regressions. The results also suggest that adding a proxy for job location does 
not change the sign of the social capital measure, but it increases the magnitude of the 
effect.   The fixed-effect estimation results suggest that social capital measures do not 
produce consistent results for moves of greater distance; however, the results are 
consistent for the MOVELST specification.  Lending strong support to the argument of 
this dissertation, the results of the Event History Analysis suggest that a strong 
connection to a neighborhood reduces the probability of moving.  Even stronger support 
is that households who have strong connections to the neighborhood are less likely to 
move farther distances.   Thus, this dissertation presents evidence that social capital has a 
negative causal effect on the decision to the decision to move; that is, high levels of 
social capital reduce the probability of moving.  This finding is consistent for all move 
variables, even when distance is included. 
This study contributes to the existing literature in multiple ways. First, it suggests 
an alternative approach to identifying the underlying mechanisms of spatial mismatch. 
The use of social capital as a reason for a voluntary stay in the neighborhood is new to 
the literature.  In addition, it incorporates the theory of irreversible investment to the 
residential mobility framework by treating mobility as an investment.  This study also 
associates the moving distance with a households’ social capital to identify whether the 
distance of the move changes the effect of the social capital measure. Finally, this study 
sets an intra-urban residential mobility framework by adding a commuting component. 
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